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BIG DATA, PATENTS, AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE 
W. Nicholson Price II† 
Big data has tremendous potential to improve health care. Unfortunately, 
intellectual property law isn’t ready to support that leap. In the next wave of data-
driven medicine, black-box medicine, researchers use sophisticated algorithms to 
examine huge troves of health data, finding complex, implicit relationships and 
making individualized assessments for patients. Black-box medicine offers potentially 
immense benefits, but also requires substantial high investment. Firms must develop 
new datasets, models, and validations, which are all nonrivalrous information goods 
with significant spillovers, requiring incentives for welfare-optimizing investment. 
Current intellectual property law fails to provide adequate incentives for black-
box medicine. The Supreme Court has sharply restricted patentable subject matter in 
the recent Prometheus, Myriad, and Alice cases, and what might still be patentable 
is limited by the statutory requirements of written description and enablement. Other 
incentives for investment, such as trade secrecy or prizes, fail to fill the gaps. These 
limits push firms away from using big data in medicine to solve big problems, and 
push firms toward small-scale incremental innovation. Small tweaks to doctrine will 
help, but are not enough. Instead, the big data needed to support transformative 
medical innovation should be considered as infrastructure for innovation and should 
be the focus of substantial public effort. 
 
 †  Assistant Professor, University of New Hampshire School of Law. J.D., Columbia 
University School of Law, 2011; Ph.D. (Biological Sciences), Columbia University Graduate 
School of Arts and Sciences, 2010. I wish to thank Ana Bračič, Glenn Cohen, Rebecca 
Eisenberg, Roger Ford, Matt Lawrence, Michael Madison, Peter Menell, Kevin Outterson, 
Geertrui Van Overwalle, Ben Roin, Rachel Sachs, Jake Sherkow, and Jeff Skopek for their 
helpful comments and feedback. Cassandra Simmons and Abhishek Shukla-Bannerjee provided 
excellent research assistance. This work benefited from feedback at the Health Law Professors’ 
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Scholars’ Conference, the Michigan State Junior Intellectual Property Scholars’ Workshop, the 
University of Tulsa Faculty Colloquium, the Suffolk IP Roundtable, and the Boston University 
Workshop on Personalized Medicine and Incentives. All errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Medicine is both expensive and imprecise. Although doctors have 
an increasingly expansive toolkit of treatment options, knowing which 
drug to give to which patient—and how much and when—requires 
substantial knowledge about differences between patients and the 
biological networks that underlie treatments. Personalized medicine 
tries to clear the fog, determining the characteristics of each patient and 
her disease and recommending the most appropriate treatment.1 
Personalized medicine has been a scientific and policy goal for years, but 
has recently received renewed policy focus.2 In President Obama’s 2015 
State of the Union Address, he announced the Precision Medicine 
Initiative,3 aimed at driving research and development of personalized 
medicine.4 
The dominant examples of personalized medicine so far are 
relationships that are well-understood and validated in clinical trials: 
For instance, using a single genetic test to find whether a patient’s 
cancer is likely to respond to a drug developed alongside that test, and 
treating the patient accordingly.5 But simple one-to-one relationships 
are only a relatively small part of biomedical complexity,6 and it is much 
harder to fully understand and clinically validate more complex 
relationships.7 Diseases and treatments are frequently dependent on 
combinations of multiple genetic variables with environmental factors 
 
 1 See infra text accompanying notes 32–40. 
 2 See, e.g., Wylie Burke & Bruce M. Psaty, Personalized Medicine in the Era of Genomics, 
298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1682 (2007); Isaac S. Chan & Geoffrey S. Ginsburg, Personalized 
Medicine: Progress and Promise, 12 GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS, 2011, at 217; Geoffrey S. 
Ginsburg & Jeanette J. McCarthy, Personalized Medicine: Revolutionizing Drug Discovery and 
Patient Care, 19 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 491 (2001); Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. 
Collins, The Path to Personalized Medicine, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 301 (2010); Pauline C. Ng et 
al., An Agenda for Personalized Medicine, 461 NATURE 724 (2009). 
 3 President Barack H. Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of 
the Union (Jan. 20, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015). 
 4 See Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 372 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 793, 793 (2015). For the purposes of this Article, “personalized medicine” 
and “precision medicine” are used synonymously. The Precision Medicine Initiative is 
discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 185–90. 
 5 See Walter P. Carney, HER2/neu Status Is an Important Biomarker in Guiding 
Personalized HER2/neu Therapy, 9 CONNECTION 25 (2006) (discussing the use of the drug 
Herceptin to treat breast cancer after clinical trials confirmed that Herceptin was effective only 
when the tumor overexpresses the gene for a particular receptor that the drug targets). 
 6 See Soumita Podder & Tapash C. Ghosh, Exploring the Differences in Evolutionary Rates 
Between Monogenic and Polygenic Disease Genes in Human, 27 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
EVOLUTION 934, 934 (2010) (noting that simple one-gene genetic disorders are much less 
common than multifactorial genetic diseases). 
 7 W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 441 (2015) 
[hereinafter Price, Black-Box Medicine]. 
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and other physical variables, like weight, blood pressure, and sex. To 
find these dependencies and relationships, personalized medicine 
cannot rely on figuring out everything explicitly and confirming via 
clinical trials.8 Instead, scientists can use sophisticated computer 
algorithms to analyze large datasets of health information, seeking 
patterns, predictions, and recommendations. This is black-box 
medicine.9 
Black-box medicine is “black-box” precisely because the 
relationships at its heart are opaque—not because their developers 
deliberately hide them, but because either they are too complex to 
understand, or they are the product of non-transparent algorithms that 
never tell the scientists, “this is what we found.”10 Opacity is not 
desirable, but is rather a necessary byproduct of the development 
process.11 
Black-box medicine lets scientists tap a wider range of biological 
relationships, and carries correspondingly broad benefits for health care. 
Matching patients to diseases and treatments more precisely could 
improve the quality of treatment, reduce the incidence of unnecessary 
side effects, and potentially save billions in wasted or inappropriate 
medical care.12 It also suggests the possibility of new treatments, 
whether by suggesting new possibilities for drug exploration or by 
repurposing already-approved drugs for new or more targeted uses.13 
Rather than health care decisions being driven only by a relatively small 
set of carefully controlled clinical trials conducted on broad categories, 
decisions could be informed by the ongoing and collective medical 
experience of hundreds of millions of other patients. Black-box 
 
 8 See P.M. Rothwell, Can Overall Results of Clinical Trials Be Applied to All Patients?, 345 
LANCET 1616 (1995). 
 9 See discussion infra Section I.A. 
 10 Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 433–34. 
 11 Id. at 434. This process-based opacity contrasts with situations where those developing 
information and algorithms deliberately keep them secret, whether for competitive advantage, 
to avoid public or government scrutiny, or for other reasons. For a description of the problems 
with deliberate secrecy and obscurity, see generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX 
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
 12 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., PRIORITIES FOR PERSONALIZED 
MEDICINE 1 (2008), https://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ostp/PCAST/pcast_report_
v2.pdf. 
 13 Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 
(forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses] (“The vast majority of 
drug compounds operate by targeting biological pathways that may affect the progress or 
symptoms of a range of diseases, and almost all drugs have ‘off-target’ activity on other 
biological pathways that may affect a different set of diseases. Consequently, it is common that 
a drug designed to treat one disease will have potential new indications for treating one or more 
entirely different conditions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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medicine promises to radically expand the reach of personalized 
medicine, with tremendous potential gains.14 
The question, then, is how to get there, and the path is not 
straightforward. Costs and hurdles exist at each phase of black-box 
medicine’s development.15 First, information must be gathered and 
vetted, which requires financial resources and navigating legal 
requirements, including privacy and informed consent.16 Second, 
developing reliable and sensitive algorithms demands dedicated efforts 
by sophisticated programmers.17 The experience of other predictive 
algorithms demonstrates this; for example, the movie-rental service 
Netflix created a three-year, multi-million dollar prize effort to improve 
its simple movie-prediction algorithm, in which thousands of teams 
managed to improve the algorithm’s performance by only ten percent.18 
Third, since complex implicit predictions are much less amenable to the 
forms of validation on which we traditionally rely—scientific 
understanding, clinical trials, and postmarket surveillance—other forms 
of validation must be developed by the innovating firm, regulators, or 
third parties—or some combination of the three.19 
Overcoming these hurdles will require significant incentives, and 
pure market incentives are likely to be woefully insufficient. Black-box 
medicine follows the classic pattern justifying intellectual property, in 
which firms underinvest in non-excludable information goods because 
they cannot capture the full social value of those goods.20 Black-box 
medicine relies principally on pure information goods: collected data, 
patterns discovered within that data, and validation of those patterns.21 
Intellectual property protection theoretically allows firms to exclude 
others from the information good and therefore appropriate a higher 
portion—though not all—of the surplus, increasing innovation closer to 
optimal levels. 
 
 14 See discussion infra Section I.A. 
 15 See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 16 See discussion infra Section I.B.1. 
 17 See discussion infra Section I.B.2. 
 18 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 439 (describing the process of Netflix 
updating its movie recommendation algorithm); The Netflix Prize Rules, NETFLIX, http://
www.netflixprize.com/rules (last visited May 9, 2015); Prizemaster, NETFLIX PRIZE (Sept. 18, 
2009 4:58 PM), http://www.netflixprize.com/community/viewtopic.php?id=1537 (announcing 
the winner and noting a 10.06% improvement in performance). 
 19 See discussion infra Section I.B.3. 
 20 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS 609, 619 (1962) (“To sum up, we expect a free enterprise economy to underinvest in 
invention and research (as compared with an ideal) because it is risky, because the product can 
be appropriated only to a limited extent, and because of increasing returns in use.”).  
 21 See discussion infra Section I.A. 
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The current intellectual property regime not only provides 
inadequate incentives for black-box medicine, but the incentives it 
provides also push the field in counterproductive directions. Patents 
provide the primary intellectual property incentives for technological 
innovation, and although patents are imperfect at driving algorithm 
development, they still create significant incentives.22 Until quite 
recently, method patents were broadly available for diagnostic 
algorithms, as long as they satisfied the Federal Circuit’s requirement 
that the invention involve a machine or a transformation of matter—
which could be satisfied by as little as performing a blood test.23 But in 
2012, the Supreme Court held in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories that a patent covering a standard diagnostic 
method—administering a drug, measuring the level of a metabolite, and 
knowing based on the result whether to increase or decrease the drug’s 
dosage—was unpatentable, as essentially claiming, and thus preempting, 
a law of nature.24 Close on the heels of Prometheus, the Court decided 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics in 2013, holding 
that isolated genomic DNA is unpatentable as a natural phenomenon;25 
such DNA patents, while not essential to diagnostic testing methods, 
provided secondary protection to those methods involving genetic 
testing.26 Finally, in 2014, the Court in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International strengthened Prometheus by holding that abstract 
inventions, such as an algorithm, were not made patentable merely by 
implementing them on a computer.27 
 
 22 See infra Section II.A. 
 23 When the Federal Circuit first addressed the Prometheus case, it held that testing blood 
for the presence of metabolites was a “transformation” sufficient to make the invention 
patentable. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2009), vacated, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010). In the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the 
Federal Circuit’s “machine or transformation test” went from a dispositive test to an 
“important and useful clue” as to whether the invention covers patentable subject matter. Bilski 
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602–04 (2010). However, the importance of this clue to the Federal 
Circuit was such that it remained practically dispositive. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) 
(holding, on remand after Bilski, that “as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and 
important clue, an investigative tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., that the 
present claims pass muster under § 101” (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604)). 
 24 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 25 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
 26 If a firm cannot fully protect diagnostic methods or algorithms that involve a piece of 
genetic information, patents on the isolated gene of interest can still prevent others from 
determining the gene variant and therefore from practicing the method. Myriad Genetics used 
this strategy to protect its breast cancer diagnostic tests. Id. at 2113. This strategy is imperfect; 
indeed, whole-genome sequencing likely circumvents isolated gene patents, see W. Nicholson 
Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome Sequencing and 
Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601 (2012), but blocked many market entrants in 
Myriad’s case.  
 27 See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014). 
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After Prometheus, Myriad, and Alice, incentives for developing 
personalized medicine—especially the complex algorithms at the heart 
of black-box medicine—are much lower than they were before.28 
Perhaps more importantly, the remaining incentives available now push 
personalized medicine in the wrong direction. Because patents are on 
stronger ground when they cover inventions that closely link devices or 
treatments to a new correlation or algorithm, firms are likely to 
prioritize development of those combination products rather than 
pursuing broader analyses of large datasets and complex correlations 
within them. This pushes firms toward maintaining the current model 
of simple, explicit relationships, rather than developing and exploiting 
the far larger realm of complex and often implicit relationships. 
In addition, firms may increasingly turn away from the patent 
system and rely instead on trade secrecy law and practices to protect 
proprietary data and algorithms.29 Secrecy is problematic for medicine 
in general, but especially for black-box medicine. Because black-box 
medicine already involves complex and frequently implicit 
relationships, as much transparency as possible is needed for validation 
and oversight. In addition, cumulative innovation based on shared data 
and algorithms is crucial to advancing the field, but is restrained by 
pervasive secrecy. 
So how can we smooth the path for black-box medicine? The first 
reaction to inadequate innovation incentives is often to throw more 
intellectual property protection at the issue to drive it forward, but this 
Article argues that this approach is insufficiently nuanced here, and that 
it raises new problems. Developing black-box medicine involves solving 
multiple interconnected problems: generating and consolidating the 
necessary data, developing algorithms and models, and validating those 
models for medical use.30 Each of those processes requires individual 
consideration through the lens of innovation policy; while algorithms 
follow familiar innovation patterns, databases—especially large, broad 
databases aimed at driving future innovation—are more similar to 
infrastructure than to inventions, and therefore need to be the subject of 
substantial public efforts to develop them. Validation of algorithms 
requires yet another set of incentives, potentially in the form of a 
 
 28 This is not to say that no incentives exist—first mover advantages, trade secrecy, and 
whatever patents are available provide some incentives. Nor is to argue that black-box medicine 
is not being developed at all—some firms are active in the space—but rather that available 
incentives are smaller than optimal and that black-box medicine is being developed less and 
more slowly than would be preferable. 
 29 See Barbara J. Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, 42 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 51 (2014) [hereinafter Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing]. 
 30 See discussion infra Section I.A. 
PRICE.37.4.6 (Do Not Delete) 4/3/2016 1:49 PM 
1408 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 37:1401 
“validation bounty” to encourage third parties to evaluate black-box 
medicine. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly describes black-
box medicine, discusses the hurdles to its development, and discusses 
the need for policy incentives. Part II addresses the patent incentives 
available for personalized medicine and the diagnostic tests and 
algorithms on which it relies. Part III addresses non-patent incentives. 
Part IV discusses potential solutions and policy interventions. A few 
brief thoughts conclude. 
I.     BLACK-BOX MEDICINE, HURDLES, AND THE NEED FOR INCENTIVES 
Black-box medicine requires substantial investment to pursue. This 
Part describes black-box medicine in more detail, then lists the three 
main types of practical developmental hurdles—data, algorithms, and 
validation—and concludes by offering the case for providing economic 
incentives to drive development forward. 
A.     Black-Box Medicine 
Medical science has long relied on clinical trials to demonstrate the 
efficacy of interventions, whether pharmaceutical, surgical, or device-
based.31 Increasingly, however, doctors, patients, scientists, and policy-
makers are recognizing that because patients are different from one 
another, medical interventions should frequently be tailored to the 
specific characteristics of each individual patient; recent years have seen 
an increased focus on personalized medicine, which relies on this 
tailoring to provide “the right drug for the right patient at the right dose 
and time.”32 In his 2015 State of the Union Address, President Obama 
announced the Precision Medicine Initiative,33 a $215 million multiyear 
initiative to accelerate the development of personalized medicine.34 
In the early stages of personalized medicine, development has 
relied on well-validated, explicit, and—as a result—relatively simple 
links between a particular patient characteristic and the resulting 
 
 31 See generally Rothwell, supra note 8. 
 32 Wolfgang Sadée & Zunyan Dai, Pharmacogenetics/Genomics and Personalized Medicine, 
14 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS (SUPPLEMENT 2) R207, R207 (2005). 
 33 Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, supra note 3. 
 34 Collins & Varmus, supra note 4; Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President 
Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/01/30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative. 
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intervention.35 The poster child of personalized medicine is the use of 
the drug Herceptin to treat breast cancer. Clinical trials confirm that 
Herceptin is effective only when the tumor overexpresses the gene for a 
particular receptor that the drug targets.36 Women who are considering 
taking Herceptin can use a test to evaluate their tumor’s expression level 
to make the right treatment decision.37 Current personalized medicine 
mostly follows this model: well-understood scientific links between 
patient characteristics and interventions are validated through clinical 
trials and then adopted into medical practice.38 
Unfortunately, this mode of development comes with substantial 
limitations. Our ability to map biological relationships explicitly is 
limited, and as a consequence we have more trouble elucidating the 
complex biological networks that underlay much of human disease.39 
Even more limited is the tool of clinical trials. More complex 
relationships split people into more precisely defined categories—that is, 
after all, the end goal of personalized medicine—but that means that 
fewer people exist in each category, and that those people are harder to 
find.40 Such splitting fits poorly with the clinical trial model of 
aggregating larger numbers of roughly comparable individuals and 
grouping them into a small number of sets to measure the difference at 
issue. For validating complex biological relationships, even assuming 
they can be identified by the underlying science, clinical trials pose 
major challenges. 
Black-box medicine seeks to address these challenges by leveraging 
the availability of large amounts of health data and the increasing 
sophistication of machine-learning algorithms.41 Health data are 
constantly expanding, including genetic sequences, metabolic screens, 
and the increasing amount of health information included in electronic 
health records.42 Sophisticated algorithms can find patterns in these 
 
 35 See, e.g., Carney, supra note 5. 
 36 Id. at 25–27. 
 37 See John C. Mansour & Roderich E. Schwarz, Molecular Mechanisms for Individualized 
Cancer Care, 207 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 250, 250–58 (2008). 
 38 See generally Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 427–29. 
 39 See, e.g., Revathi Rajkumar & Ferhaan Ahmad, The Genomic Complexity Underlying 
Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension: From Mendel to Networks, 189 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & 
CRITICAL CARE MED. 1152 (2014) (describing complex interactions of genetic and 
environmental factors); Takanori Watanabe et al., Disease Prediction Based on Functional 
Connectomes Using a Scalable and Spatially-Informed Support Vector Machine, NEUROIMAGE, 
Aug. 1, 2014, at 183 (using machine-learning techniques to analyze six-dimensional spatial 
mappings of neuronal connections in the brain to predict schizophrenia). 
 40 Ultimately, the goal is to base medical decisions on the full picture of each unique 
individual; in a real sense, then, the eventual number of precisely relevant individuals should 
converge to one. 
 41 See generally Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7. 
 42 See id. at 430–31. 
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data, whether those patterns reflect which patients are likely to benefit 
most from a limited resource like an inpatient hospital bed,43 what 
pattern of 5000 genes predicts how a lung tumor will respond to 
treatment,44 or the possibility that a patient with an unremarkable 
collection of characteristics is actually at very high risk for a rare 
disease.45 
While machine-learning algorithms can pull useful relationships 
out of large datasets, the challenge is that such relationships are 
frequently opaque.46 Sometimes, the relationships will be formally 
opaque—that is, in some machine learning techniques, it is actually 
impossible to state how the algorithm classifies observations once it has 
been developed.47 Other times, the relationships will only be practically 
opaque—that is, they may be so complicated that they defy explicit 
understanding, like a relationship between fifty genes, several 
environmental factors, and a health outcome.48 In either case, the 
opacity of the relationships makes them hard to impossible to validate 
by the traditional methods of scientific understanding and clinical 
trials.49  
In sum, black-box medicine is the use of non-transparent 
computer algorithms to make health-care decisions.50 It has tremendous 
 
 43 See I. Glenn Cohen et al., The Legal and Ethical Concerns that Arise from Using Complex 
Predictive Analytics in Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1139, 1140 (2014). 
 44 Hojin Moon et al., Ensemble Methods for Classification of Patients for Personalized 
Medicine with High-Dimensional Data, 41 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MED. 197 (2007). 
 45 Joseph A. Cruz & David S. Wishart, Applications of Machine Learning in Cancer 
Prediction and Prognosis, 2 CANCER INFORMATICS 59 (2007). 
 46 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 432–34. 
 47 See id. at 433–34. 
 48 See id. at 434. 
 49 See id. at 440–41. 
 50 More precisely, there are two different types of algorithms involved in black-box 
medicine. The first is the machine-learning algorithm itself, which identifies patterns; the 
second is a prediction/recommendation algorithm incorporating insights from the first. These 
two may be unified or separated. To take a simple example from explicit personalized medicine, 
consider the case of the cancer drug Herceptin and expression levels of the receptor gene 
HER2/neu, mentioned above. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. Only tumors 
overexpressing HER2/neu are responsive to Herceptin treatment. See supra notes 36–37 and 
accompanying text. Assuming the relationship was unknown, one could conceive of a search 
algorithm designed to find the relationship. Such an algorithm could examine a dataset 
containing expression levels for many genes and tumor responsiveness to Herceptin, 
calculating correlations between each gene’s expression level and responsiveness, returning the 
strongest correlation—presumably HER2/neu. See, e.g., Erdal Cosgun et al., High-Dimensional 
Pharmacogenetic Prediction of a Continuous Trait Using Machine Learning Techniques with 
Application to Warfarin Dose Prediction in African Americans, 27 BIOINFORMATICS 1384, 
1385–86 (2011) (describing algorithms deployed to find alleles related to warfarin dosing in an 
African-American cohort). That search would then yield a separate, much simpler treatment-
recommendation algorithm: measure the expression level of HER2/neu, and if that level is 
above a certain threshold, treat with Herceptin; otherwise, pursue a different strategy. See, e.g., 
id. at 1386–87 (discussing performance of resulting models recommending warfarin dosage). In 
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potential for health care, and raises possibilities for substantial savings 
both in development (as compared to traditional medical development 
pathways) and in application (since a closer match between patient and 
treatment can avoid costly errors and wasted treatment). However, 
black-box medicine still requires substantial resources to develop. 
B.     Hurdles to Development 
Black-box medicine promises the possibility of identifying new 
treatments and targeting those treatments for substantially lower costs, 
in time and money, than the current explicit pathway for developing 
personalized medicine. Nevertheless, black-box medicine still faces 
substantial practical hurdles in development.51 This Section addresses 
three key hurdles. First, black-box medicine requires the assembly of 
large, high-quality datasets of health information. Second, algorithms 
themselves must be developed, which requires substantial expertise. 
Third and finally, predictive relationships must be validated to assure 
safe and effective use in medical practice. 
1.     Datasets 
The first, and likely most expensive, requirement for black-box 
medicine is the generation of large, high-quality datasets of health 
information. A key advantage of black-box medicine is that the expense 
of data creation is not required, because black-box medicine relies 
principally on sophisticated retrospective analyses. Thus, the 
extraordinarily expensive process of clinical trials is not necessary. 
However, the effective use of existing and contemporaneously generated 
data requires surmounting at least two practical challenges: acquiring 
 
other, more complex or opaque situations, the search and prediction algorithms would be the 
same; for instance, a neural network trained on a set of data to perform complex classification 
tasks is both the search algorithm (as it is being trained) and the prediction algorithm (once 
trained, and in use thereafter). See, e.g., Francesco Ciompi et al., Automatic Classification of 
Pulmonary Peri-Fissural Nodules in Computed Tomography Using an Ensemble of 2D Views and 
a Convolutional Neural Network out-of-the-Box, MED. IMAGE ANALYSIS, Dec. 2015, at 195 
(describing neural networks trained and used in lung cancer screening). For ease of 
explanation, these two algorithmic functions are elided through the remainder of this Article. 
 51 Black-box medicine also faces substantial policy and legal questions, including how it will 
be regulated, how it will be reimbursed, and how privacy and informed consent concerns will 
be adequately addressed. These policy questions are outside the scope of this article, though 
they are noted and briefly described in Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 442–66. To 
the extent that uncertainty about policy questions decreases the expected benefits to a firm of 
developing a particular black-box implementation, those concerns reduce innovation incentives 
as well. 
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and linking data from different sources, and ensuring the quality of the 
final dataset. 
a.     Data Collection 
First, firms must gain access to the substantial amounts of data in 
electronic form. As electronic medical records become more prevalent, 
collecting data should become practically easier because data must only 
be collected and translated, not moved from paper records into 
electronic form. However, paper records will remain significant for the 
development of black-box medicine, as they are necessary to provide 
legacy data and information to elucidate longer-term patterns.52 Other 
data are new in kind; as broad screening tests, such as whole-genome 
sequencing or metabolic screens, move into more widespread practice, 
the data available to be gathered will likewise increase.53 
Concerns regarding economics and patient-consent are potentially 
more challenging. Health data are valuable; health care systems know it, 
and health care providers and patients sometimes do as well.54 Getting 
information will often require compensating whoever has gathered the 
information in the first place—done the testing, compiled the records, 
or conducted the screening—or the patient whose data is being 
gathered, or both. In either case, consent from patients will generally be 
required, either at the initial data collection (which may or may not have 
already happened) or at the transfer of data.55 
There is a large exception to the consent requirement: in many 
situations, the most straightforward way to acquire individual-level 
patient data is to anonymize that information.56 However, 
anonymization runs into two interrelated problems. First, 
 
 52 See Diane Dolezel & Jackie Moczygemba, Implementing EHRs: An Exploratory Study to 
Examine Current Practices in Migrating Physician Practice, PERSP. HEALTH INFO. MGMT., 
Winter 2015, at 2–3, 13; Roy Schoenberg & Charles Safran, Internet Based Repository of Medical 
Records that Retains Patient Confidentiality, 321 BMJ 1199, 1199 (2000). 
 53 See Antonio Regalado, EmTech: Illumina Says 228,000 Human Genomes Will Be 
Sequenced this Year, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/
531091/emtech-illumina-says-228000-human-genomes-will-be-sequenced-this-year. 
 54 See Barbara J. Evans, Sustainable Access to Data for Postmarketing Medical Product Safety 
Surveillance Under the Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 11 (2014) 
[hereinafter Evans, Sustainable Access to Data]; Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, 
Privacy & the Public Interest, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 586 (2010). 
 55 Consent is required under the Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2015), of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 
U.S.C.).  
 56 Anonymization is enough to remove the requirement of patient consent for data use 
under HIPAA. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a). For a discussion of the substantial differences 
between anonymity and privacy, see Jeffrey M. Skopek, Anonymity, the Production of Goods, 
and Institutional Design, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751 (2014). 
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anonymization is imperfect; even if patient-identifying information is 
removed from a medical record, the remaining information can be used 
to re-identify the individual.57 Second, anonymization complicates the 
task of assembling data about one patient into integrated records. If data 
from one source about a particular individual cannot be matched with 
data from another source about that same individual, substantial 
information is lost. Similarly, if information from a patient at one point 
in time cannot be supplemented with later information, risks and 
benefits are much harder to evaluate and leverage. While technological 
solutions are feasible,58 they create an added layer of complexity, and the 
more robust the mechanism for ensuring that all of an individual’s data 
can in fact be collected in a single record, the greater the chance of re-
identification for that individual, both based on the collation 
mechanism and on the collected health data themselves.59 
Individual corporations have gathered significant amounts of 
patients’ health data; however, those data are typically jealously guarded 
and unavailable for others to use in developing medical models.60 As 
 
 57 See, e.g., Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, How (Not) to Protect Genomic Data Privacy 
in a Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-Identification to Evaluate and Design Anonymity 
Protection Systems, 37 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 179 (2004); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of 
Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); 
Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117 (2013); Jane 
Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011). Note that re-
identification is a practical and ethical concern more than a legal one, as current regimes 
typically do not acknowledge the possibility. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.514(a)–(b)(2). Access to at 
least some currently anonymous datasets requires an agreement that the requester will not 
attempt to re-identify the individuals whose data is being shared. See, e.g., Data Use 
Restrictions, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://wonder.cdc.gov/
DataUse.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2015) (“The CDC/ATSDR Policy on Releasing and Sharing 
Data prohibits linking these data with other data sets or information for the purpose of 
identifying an individual.”). 
 58 Vanderbilt’s eMerge Network follows this model. See About, EMERGE NETWORK, https://
emerge.mc.vanderbilt.edu/about-emerge (last visited Dec. 22, 2015); see also Kristin Madison, 
Health Regulators as Data Stewards, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1605, 1616 (2014) (“Participants in the 
network agree to submit genetic data to a coordinating center that will then combine the data 
with the network dataset and submit them to the database of Genotypes and Phenotypes, which 
makes individual-level genetic data available to researchers.”). 
 59 For instance, if the collation mechanism allows those adding data into a database to 
access the identity of the data record and the data being added in order to ensure that the 
record is entirely about the same person, that would be a collation mechanism that could 
breach anonymity. On the other hand, if the result of a perfectly anonymous collation 
mechanism is a dataset that contains very large amounts of health data for each referenced 
individual, that amount of data helps enable re-identification efforts. For an overview of re-
identification challenges, see Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010). 
 60 See, e.g., Press Release, 23andMe, 23andMe Announces Collaboration with Pfizer Inc. to 
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described earlier, black-box medicine relies on identifying complex 
patterns in health datasets. Its strength, both in finding relationships 
and in verifying that those relationships are real, depends on having 
large datasets with varied patients. Keeping data separate in corporate 
data silos, particularly silos created for particular medical or economic 
purposes,61 enervates the broader power of black-box medicine. 
b.     Data Quality 
The second major challenge is ensuring the quality of the collected 
data. Because black-box medicine relies on data-based development and 
validation, and lacks the potential for specific scientific or clinical 
validation, data quality is especially important. Errors in data can lead to 
false pattern recognition, although theoretically, only biased data should 
create such problems. Data that are afflicted by random error make 
patterns harder to recognize, however, decreasing the number of 
relationships that can be discovered and used and requiring larger 
datasets to observe the same patterns. 
As others have noted, problems in data quality can arise in multiple 
ways.62 Front-line coders—that is, the doctor entering data in her office 
or the technician reporting lab results—can introduce simple human 
error when inputting data into electronic systems.63 Entering data from 
paper records creates another opportunity for human error.64 
In addition to random error, data quality problems can arise due to 
systemic incentives inherent in the data collection environment. Much 
biomedical data is collected in and for insurance records. Doctors have 
incentives to “upcode” treatments to receive higher reimbursement; 
even in situations that fall short of fraud, ambiguous situations are more 
likely to be coded as the more expensive alternative.65 Setting aside 
 
a collaboration allowing Pfizer to research lupus using 23andMe’s “largest dataset of its kind,” 
including over 800,000 individuals’ genotyped samples). 
 61 Myriad Genetics, for instance, developed a business strategy focused on being the 
exclusive provider of tests for the BRCA1/2 breast-cancer-predisposition genes. Myriad has a 
strong interest in keeping other researchers from using its data, and has no incentive to 
integrate its data into broader health prediction pictures so long as those analyses are 
conducted or controlled by others. Accordingly, Myriad’s extensive data on BRCA1/2 variants 
and their significance are generally unavailable to others developing predictive algorithms, 
along with the health data collected on the women who provided the data and, in many cases, 
their relatives. See Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 233, at 240–54 (2015). 
 62 See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, The Use and Misuse of Biomedical Data: Is 
Bigger Really Better?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 497, 515–21 (2013). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Christopher S. Brunt, CPT Fee Differentials and Visit Upcoding Under Medicare Part B, 
20 HEALTH ECON. 831 (2011). This incentive largely relies on the dominant fee-for-service 
model, and is likely to be decreased or eliminated in capitated payment plans, where the health 
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biased incentives, the purpose of insurance data collection—ensuring 
that appropriate payments are made—means that more emphasis is put 
on cost-related aspects of treatment, and medically relevant differences 
may be elided.66 
Ensuring the greatest possible quality for black-box medicine 
datasets requires combating these sources of error and bias. To the 
extent that redundant data can be gathered—for instance, both 
insurance reimbursement records and electronic health records—those 
redundant sources can be compared to identify potential coding 
mistakes. In the process of physically coding information from paper 
records to electronic datasets, multiple coders can be used and 
intercoder reliability used as a check on quality. 
Overall, assembling the data needed to develop black-box medicine 
may present the largest cost hurdle to its development. It requires 
coordination among multiple data sources, checks on quality, and—
though not discussed in detail here—compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements.67 These expenses are likely much less than the 
tremendous costs associated with generating gold-standard clinical trial 
data, but are nonetheless significant. Good data are the foundation of 
black-box medicine, and require investment accordingly. 
2.     Algorithm Development 
The second major cost hurdle for black-box medicine is its heart: 
the development of algorithms to find patterns in the data and then to 
predict medical outcomes and recommend treatment. Predictive 
algorithms are increasingly sophisticated—indeed, that sophistication 
enables the possibility of black-box medicine in the first place—but their 
development continues to require substantial time, programming 
 
care provider is compensated per patient or per episode of care rather than by procedure. James 
C. Robinson, Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives, 79 MILBANK 
Q. 149, 158 (2001). 
 66 See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 62, at 519. 
 67 Research must comply with HIPAA, especially its Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 
164; the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, which governs human subjects research funded by any 
of several government agencies; FDA human subjects research rules, if intended to support 
drug approval, 21 C.F.R. pt. 50; and various other regulatory requirements. See, e.g., KRISTEN 
ROSATI ET AL., MINI-SENTINEL PRIVACY PANEL, HIPAA AND COMMON RULE COMPLIANCE IN 
THE MINI-SENTINEL PILOT (2011), http://mini-sentinel.org/work_products/About_Us/
HIPAA%20and%20Common%20Rule%20Compliance%20in%20the%20Mini-Sentinel%
20Pilot.pdf (describing HIPAA and Common Rule requirements for FDA’s Mini-Sentinel pilot 
project to monitor adverse drug reactions); Evans, Sustainable Access to Data, supra note 54 
(discussing policy issues with FDA’s Sentinel project); Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, 
at 454–57 (describing privacy concerns in black-box medicine). A full accounting of these 
requirements is outside the scope of this Article. 
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experience, and computational resources. Even simple predictive 
algorithms, such as movie recommendations for the video-on-demand 
service Netflix, require major effort to develop and optimize.68 Relatively 
small and simple datasets can still run into constraints in terms of 
computer processing power,69 and expert programmers are generally 
required to develop the most appropriate algorithms. In other, more 
complex fields where predictive algorithms are deployed, such as 
finance or creditworthiness, even more significant investments are 
required for algorithmic development.70 
3.     Validation 
The third and final cost hurdle for black-box medicine is the 
requirement for validation to ensure high quality. Black-box medicine 
lacks the validation of scientific understanding and clinical trials, and 
thus requires other approaches. Ensuring that black-box algorithms are 
as well validated as possible based on available data is crucial to 
improving health-care quality, as well as to promoting provider and 
patient acceptance.71 
Algorithms developed exclusively through discerning patterns in 
complex health data lack the two typical forms of validation used in 
current models of personalized medicine: scientific understanding and 
targeted clinical trials.72 Although some current medical treatments are 
developed and applied without an understanding of mechanism,73 in 
most instances we understand approximately how and why the 
treatment works. This scientific understanding provides a base-level 
validation of a treatment option; if we can say that a particular 
 
 68 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 439 (describing the process of Netflix 
updating its movie recommendation algorithm). 
 69 See ANDREAS TÖSCHER, MICHAEL JAHRER & ROBERT M. BELL, THE BIGCHAOS SOLUTION 
TO THE NETFLIX GRAND PRIZE 3, 9, 15, 17 (2009), http://www.netflixprize.com/assets/
GrandPrize2009_BPC_BigChaos.pdf (noting that some algorithms could only be run a limited 
number of times due to memory, storage, and processing power limitations). 
 70 PASQUALE, supra note 11. 
 71 Validation is a challenge from both innovation and regulation points of view, since it 
impacts both technological development and the assurance of high quality for public use. These 
two goals are intertwined; the creation of information about new medical technologies is itself a 
form of innovation. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in 
Innovation Policy]. 
 72 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 440–42. 
 73 For instance, aspirin had an unknown mechanism of action for decades, and lithium’s 
mechanism is still not well understood. See Gin S. Malhi et al., Potential Mechanisms of Action 
of Lithium in Bipolar Disorder, 27 CNS DRUGS 135, 136 (2013); J. R. Vane, Inhibition of 
Prostaglandin Synthesis as a Mechanism of Action for Aspirin-like Drugs, 231 NATURE NEW 
BIOLOGY 232 (1971). 
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monoclonal antibody treats rheumatoid arthritis because it targets a 
protein receptor that triggers the inflammatory response, that 
understanding provides validation that the treatment is at least 
potentially legitimate and effective.74 When the relationships are too 
complex to understand, or are literally opaque, scientific understanding 
is a priori unavailable as a potential source of validation. 
The second typical form of validation, required for FDA approval 
for most treatment options or diagnostic tests, comes in the form of 
targeted clinical trials. Different sets of patients receive the specific 
treatment, and if the treated set of patients showed statistically 
significant improvements over the control set, the clinical trial validates 
the treatment. Black-box medicine algorithms are largely not amenable 
to clinical trials because the underlying relationships are either 
unknown or too complex to collect sufficiently large patient samples. 
This is especially true of more holistic algorithms that incorporate 
multiple relationships into more general predictions and 
recommendations. 
In the development and validation of black-box medicine, large 
unbiased samples can partially substitute for the methodological 
strength of randomized clinical trials, but some form of validation is still 
required to ensure the strength, accuracy, and quality of the resulting 
algorithm. Because the traditional forms of validation are unavailable, 
black-box medicine should rely instead on efforts by external parties to 
computationally support the original algorithm, both by evaluating the 
development parameters (i.e., how the algorithm was developed) and by 
trying to independently reach similar results through parallel 
computational methods—ideally on parallel data.75 This validation 
effort, which is closely tied to regulation for quality, is nonetheless a 
form of costly innovation, and a hurdle that black-box medicine will 
need to overcome. 
Overall, the costs and hurdles associated with developing black-box 
medicine are significant and require major investment from relevant 
stakeholders. This does not in itself justify policy intervention to 
increase incentives; in many situations, the market is expected to reward 
the need for large investment, so that no particular policy action need be 
taken. The next Section briefly makes the case that additional incentives 
are required for black-box medicine’s development. 
 
 74 Nancy J. Olsen & C. Michael Stein, New Drugs for Rheumatoid Arthritis, 350 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2167, 2170–75 (2004). 
 75 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at Section II.C. 
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C.     The Need for Incentives 
The basic justification for intellectual property is a well-told story.76 
Society derives tremendous benefits from innovation, but absent 
intellectual property, ideas are frequently expensive to produce but hard 
to protect.77 In addition to the initial discovery, the process of taking an 
idea through the development into a commercial product can be costly 
and is frequently subject to free-riding.78 Since firms cannot capture 
much of the value of their investments in innovation, they invest at a 
socially suboptimal level.79 Intellectual property allows firms to capture 
some of that surplus, increasing the incentives for invention by allowing 
firms to exclude others from the invention.80 Black-box medicine 
follows this pattern closely: databases, algorithms, and the knowledge 
that algorithms are reliable are all information goods, which are difficult 
to keep exclusive once known. Accordingly, intellectual property—or a 
substitute incentive set—is likely necessary for its socially optimal 
development.81 
The patent system fills this role by guaranteeing significant 
protection in exchange for disclosure of the technology, thus increasing 
the type of protection available and enabling more cumulative 
innovation.82 Patents provide an alternative to either not developing an 
appropriable innovation or keeping it secret. Secrecy prevents 
appropriation and is bolstered by the mostly state-law doctrine of trade 
 
 76 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for 
Intellectual Property]; Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and 
Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
193, 195–98 (2005); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 507–09 (2009) [hereinafter Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of 
Patentability]. 
 77 See Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, supra note 76, 
at 129. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
1329 (1987) (describing computer software as a public good with positive network externalities 
and suggesting government intellectual property interventions to encourage its development). 
 82 Patents also hamper cumulative innovation, if the patent on the original invention blocks 
the second innovator from developing her innovation; the extent to which this occurs is 
something of an open empirical question. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the 
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 
29; see also Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The 
Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 838–44 (2001) (describing how 
patent doctrine can facilitate cumulative innovation). However, effective trade secrecy can very 
effectively prevent cumulative innovation because the mechanics of the initial innovation never 
become known. 
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secrecy,83 but works poorly for innovations which can be reverse-
engineered or which are unavoidably public.84 In addition, trade secrecy 
limits cumulative innovation, where different innovators build on the 
inventions and innovations of other firms.85 
Overall, black-box medicine is a promising branch of personalized 
medicine that offers significant advances, but also requires significant 
investment in nonexcludable goods. Due to its nature as a public 
information good, firms are likely to invest in black-box medicine below 
socially desirable levels. Accordingly, innovation incentives should be 
provided at the policy level. The next Part turns to existing patent 
incentives offered by the intellectual property system, and failures in 
those incentives to drive the development of black-box medicine.86 
II.     PATENT INCENTIVES 
Patents are a key policy tool to drive technological innovation, and 
are particularly important in the biomedical fields, playing a crucial role 
in the development of new drugs and biologics.87 Patents have also been 
the subject of significant dispute in those fields.88 In general, therefore, 
 
 83 For a general overview of trade secrecy law, see Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade 
Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 247–51 (1998). 
 84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (listing 
reverse engineering as a proper means of acquiring a trade secret). Trade secrecy in the context 
of black-box medicine will be discussed below in Section III.C.2. 
 85 See Bone, supra note 83, at 266–67. 
 86 One important caveat is that this description of incentives applies most cleanly to well-
defined, relatively stable algorithms—that is, algorithms that are developed once and then used 
for some time. Black-box medicine offers the possibility of more plastic algorithms, however, 
that are constantly updated as new information is received. A full analysis of the incentive 
implications of such flexible second-generation algorithms is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 87 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 717 (2005); Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, supra note 76. 
Many commentators have also criticized this view and the dominance of pharmaceutical 
patents. See, e.g., Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential 
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27 (2002); Tim Hubbard & Jamie 
Love, Medicines Without Barriers, NEW SCIENTIST, June 14, 2003, at 29. 
 88 Various policy arguments around patents have included the use of patents to extend drug 
monopolies for longer terms than contemplated in the patent term, see, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill 
& Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in 
Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327 (2012); alleged antitrust violations when brand-name 
drug companies and generic companies agree to delay generic market entry in patent litigation, 
see, e.g., Lisa Allen, Note, Reviewing the Legality of Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment 
Settlements: The FTC Doesn’t Get It Right, 8 GEO. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 245 (2010); Daniel A. Crane, 
Per Se Illegality for Reverse Payment Patent Settlements, 61 ALA. L. REV. 575 (2010); Ronald W. 
Davis, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements: A View into the Abyss, and a Modest Proposal, 21 
ANTITRUST 26 (2006); the Supreme Court’s take on the issue in Federal Trade Commission v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (holding that such settlements should be scrutinized under 
antitrust’s rule of reason); and international patent protection hindering patients’ access to 
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patents might appear to provide at least some incentives for the 
development of algorithms central to black-box medicine, as well as 
potentially data and validation. However, recent changes to patent 
subject-matter eligibility law have severely limited those incentives, 
leaving an incentive landscape that drives personalized medicine away 
from black-box medicine.89 In addition, persistent concerns about 
black-box medicine’s ability to meet the written description and 
enablement provisions of section 112 of the Patent Act make patents 
more challenging to obtain even if subject-matter eligibility concerns 
were to be overcome.90 
A.     Subject Matter Eligibility 
The first question arising for black-box medicine is whether its key 
innovations can be patented at all. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, patents can be 
granted for machines, manufactures, processes, or compositions of 
matter.91 Although these broad categories embrace “anything under the 
sun that is made by man,”92 they are not infinitely broad, and in 
particular, they fail to address two of the three key technological hurdles 
related to black-box medicine. Facts and data do not fall within one of 
the four categories of patentable subject matter, and thus the collected 
data enabling black-box medicine are unpatentable. Similarly, the result 
of validation—that is, whether an algorithm works or not, and how well 
it might work—is similarly outside the scope of patentable subject 
matter. This leaves only the algorithms that actually drive black-box 
medicine as potential subjects of patent protection. Here, however, 
judicial exceptions to patentability come into play. The Supreme Court 
has articulated three exceptions to patentable subject matter: abstract 
ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature.93 In a string of cases, and 
especially in the 2012 case of Mayo v. Prometheus, the Court has made it 
 
lifesaving drugs in developing nations, see, e.g., Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do 
Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 1886 (2001); Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the 
Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211 (2004); Sigrid Sterckx, Patents and 
Access to Drugs in Developing Countries: An Ethical Analysis, 4 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 
58 (2004). Patents for surgical techniques also raised a furor when they were introduced, but 
have since been statutorily limited. See Robert M. Portman, Legislative Restriction on Medical 
and Surgical Procedure Patents Removes Impediment to Medical Progress, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 91 (1996); see also 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012). 
 89 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 90 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 91 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 92 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 93 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
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clear that personalized medicine algorithms will be brought within the 
ambit of patentability only with great difficulty.94 
1.     Algorithms Before Mayo v. Prometheus 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s Prometheus decisions in 2012, 
patenting diagnostic models was much easier.95 Although longstanding 
judicial exceptions prohibited patenting of laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, or abstract ideas,96 firms could patent broad methods of 
treatment where the novel contribution was the newly discovered 
underlying biological relationship. Algorithms standing alone may be 
abstract ideas, and biological correlations alone may be laws of nature, 
but putting those into a broader method claim was relatively easy.97 
Thus, essentially all uses of the algorithm could be protected. 
Before Prometheus, the Federal Circuit had held generally that a 
broad diagnostic method was patentable so long as it was either linked 
to a machine, or resulted in a transformation of matter (the “machine or 
transformation” test).98 This test was disapproved in Bilski but remained 
an “important clue” to patentability99 and generally supported the 
patentability of diagnostic tests until Prometheus. Thus, patent 
incentives were typically available for diagnostic algorithms.100 
All this is not to say that patents provided ideal incentives for the 
algorithm development at the heart of black-box medicine. Complex 
and especially implicit algorithms are more difficult to describe 
sufficiently than other inventions, making it harder to satisfy section 
 
 94 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). For a 
detailed description of this line of cases and its application to diagnostic tests, see Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015). 
 95 See Eisenberg, supra note 94. 
 96 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185. 
 97 Extensive case history and subsequent scholarship treats the patentability of algorithms. 
See, e.g., id.; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); 
Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959 (1986) (describing 
the doctrine surrounding algorithm patentability). Flook and Diehr are “difficult to reconcile,” 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics, Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms, 
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341, 343 (2013), but this Article focuses on case law that is more recent 
and directly on-point. 
 98 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Metabolite 
Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 99 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603–04 (2010). 
 100 Of course, the patentable subject matter inquiry is only part of the patentability inquiry. 
The claimed invention must also be useful, novel, non-obvious, and enabled. See 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–103, 112 (2012). 
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112’s written description requirement.101 In addition, complex 
algorithm patents are hard to enforce, especially when those algorithms 
are embedded in medical practice, due to difficulties detecting when the 
patented algorithm is being used.102 However, the patent incentives for 
diagnostic algorithms, while imperfect, were at least still available prior 
to 2012. 
2.     Mayo v. Prometheus 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Prometheus dramatically changed 
this situation by holding diagnostic methods essentially unpatentable.103 
Prometheus involved two patents of the type described above related to 
the use of thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases.104 Claim 1 of 
patent 6,355,623, which both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court 
took as exemplary,105 claims 
[a] method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for 
treatment . . . comprising: (a) administering a drug . . . and (b) 
determining the level of [the metabolite] . . . wherein [a metabolite 
level below a certain threshold] indicates a need to increase the 
amount of said drug . . . and wherein [a metabolite level above a 
different threshold] indicates a need to decrease the amount of said 
drug subsequently administered to [the] subject.106 
Prometheus Laboratories (Prometheus), the exclusive licensee of the 
patents, sells diagnostic kits that embody the patented process.107 Mayo 
Clinic Rochester and Mayo Collaborative Services (collectively, Mayo) 
bought those kits and used them until 2004, when Mayo decided to start 
making, using, and selling its own kits, with slightly different metabolite 
level limits.108 Prometheus brought an infringement action in district 
court, which held the patents infringed but invalid as claiming a natural 
law.109 The Federal Circuit reversed on the grounds that the patents’ 
“administering” and “determining” steps satisfied the “machine or 
 
 101 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 102 See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, Essay, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits 
of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013) (noting the difficulty in enforcing patents on information 
about which treatments do not work). 
 103 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 1297–98 
(2012). 
 104 Id. at 1294; U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302 (filed 
Dec. 27, 2001). 
 105 See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. 
 106 U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999). 
 107 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. 
 108 Id. at 1295–96. 
 109 Id. at 1296. 
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transformation” test, and therefore, held that the patents did not 
encompass laws of nature.110 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held the invention was not 
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act.111 Rather 
than a “genuine application” of an unpatentable natural law, the court 
said that the patent was invalid because it merely provides the natural 
law and “tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity”—namely, measuring metabolite levels and then 
using Prometheus’s new information to inform treatment decisions.112 
Accordingly, the patent was invalid.113 But this describes the majority of 
medical diagnostics and black-box medicine. 
Under the decision’s strikingly broad general analysis, many, if not 
most, biological diagnostic tests can be characterized as only involving 
steps that measure levels of biological molecules and then relating that 
measurement to an underlying natural connection to provide 
information about the patient’s biological characteristics, including 
genes and their expression levels.114 Under Prometheus, “routine, 
obvious” pre- or post-solution activity cannot make a claim patentable if 
it is primarily directed to a law of nature; thus, combining diagnostic 
methods with standard practice procedures will typically not aid 
patentability.115 Notably, though the correlation in Prometheus was quite 
simple, nothing in the opinion limits it to simple relationships, and the 
Court explicitly eschewed choosing among different laws of nature.116 
 
 110 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). The full procedural history is somewhat more complex. The Federal Circuit held in 2009 
that the patents claimed patentable subject matter under its then-dispositive “machine or 
transformation test.” Prometheus Labs. Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded with instructions to 
reconsider in light of its holding in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), that “the machine or 
transformation test” was not dispositive, but was merely an important and useful clue to the 
patentable subject matter inquiry. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 561 U.S. 
1040 (2010). On remand, the Federal Circuit found the satisfaction of the test sufficient as a 
clue to patentability and again held the patents as claiming patentable subject matter. 
Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1355, rev’d, 132 S. Ct. at 1296. 
 111 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See, e.g., U. I. Schwarz, Clinical Relevance of Genetic Polymorphisms in the Human 
CYP2C9 Gene, 33 EUR. J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION (SUPPLEMENT S2) 23, 23–30 (2003). 
 115 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. 
 116 Id. at 1303 (“[O]ur cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature according 
to whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow. . . . [T]he cases have 
endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and 
the like . . . .”). 
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Thus, the complexity of relationships in black-box medicine is unlikely 
to make them patentable under section 101.117 
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued guidance to its 
examiners espousing a broad interpretation of Prometheus,118 and both 
district courts and the Federal Circuit have invalidated diagnostic test 
patents based on Prometheus.119 Since most, if not all, diagnostic tests 
center on identifying new laws of nature and inserting them into the 
normal flow of clinical practice, Prometheus strikes directly at the 
 
 117 One potential alternate analysis would ask whether the interventions suggested by black-
box medicine would themselves be non-routine, which could help a tailored medical treatment 
patent pass the Prometheus test. But this analysis would apply only to some methods. For 
instance, a black-box algorithm’s suggestion to address the risk of a stroke by prescribing an 
antidepressant might be viewed as a non-routine intervention, but an algorithm that merely 
identified a buried risk of stroke and suggested normal treatment would likely be viewed as 
engaging in routine activity. The uncertainty of this analysis could reduce patent incentives 
even if some broader methods might still be patentable. 
 118 See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination 
Policy to the Patent Examining Corps, 2014 Procedure for Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis of 
Claims Reciting or Involving Laws of Nature/Natural Principles, Natural Phenomena, and/or 
Natural Products (Mar. 4, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 USPTO Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance], 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad-mayo_guidance.pdf. This guidance 
emphasizes that “all claims . . . reciting or involving laws of nature/natural principles, natural 
phenomena, and/or natural products” must be analyzed using a three-part method: 
[(i)] Is the claimed invention directed to one of the four statutory patent-eligible 
subject matter categories: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter? . . . [(ii)] Does the claim recite or involve one or more judicial 
exceptions? . . . Judicial exceptions include abstract ideas, laws of nature/natural 
principles, natural phenomena, and natural products. . . . [(iii)] Does the claim as a 
whole recite something significantly different than the judicial exception(s). 
Id. at 2–3. 
 119 In PerkinElmer v. Intema, the Federal Circuit held invalid a claim over a test that 
established the risk of fetal Down syndrome. PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 F. App’x 65, 
71 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The claimed methods compared marker measurements with each other to 
predict the risk of Down syndrome. Id. at 69. The claim was analogous to that in Prometheus, 
and thus invalid, because it merely claimed a co-occurrence between biological molecules and a 
natural statistical relationship. Id. at 71. Similarly, in SmartGene v. Advanced Biological 
Laboratories, a nonprecedential opinion, the Federal Circuit held unpatentable a system 
paradigmatic of black-box medicine-type diagnostics, though it relied on expert rules rather 
than implicit relationships. SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). In the patent at issue, the representative claim 1 recited the steps of “(a) 
providing patient information to a computing device comprising” of three different knowledge 
bases: “therapeutic treatment regimens,” expert rules and advisory information useful for the 
treatment of a particular disease or medical condition; “(b) generating . . . a ranked listing of 
available therapeutic treatment regimens . . . ; and (c) generating . . . advisory information.” Id. 
at 951–52. The Federal Circuit held that the patent covered abstract ideas, relying both on prior 
Federal Circuit precedent and on Prometheus. See id. at 954–56. For further discussion, see 
Timo Minssen & David Nilsson, The US Supreme Court in Mayo v. Prometheus—Taking the 
Fire from or to Biotechnology and Personalized Medicine?, 2 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 376, 
383 (2012). 
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patentability of diagnostics and the personalized medicine of which they 
are an integral part.120 
Other recent Supreme Court precedent has bolstered the 
conclusion that diagnostic and black-box medicine innovations are 
often unpatentable. In 2013, the Supreme Court held in Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics that isolated DNA sequences 
and other isolated natural phenomena are unpatentable.121 While the 
decision did not directly address medical algorithms, patents on the raw 
materials of medical analyses (genetic sequences, metabolites, RNA, and 
the like) could have potentially provided a complement to now-
unavailable patents on the analyses—but no longer. The Myriad patents 
also claimed genetic diagnostic methods, which the Federal Circuit had 
already held to be unpatentable subject matter under Prometheus.122 
Finally, in 2014, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International strengthened 
Prometheus by clarifying that abstract inventions, such as algorithms, do 
not become patentable merely because they are implemented on a 
computer.123 Perhaps more importantly, Alice vigorously reaffirmed the 
principles and broad reach of Prometheus.124 Prometheus, buttressed by 
Myriad and Alice, is now likely to drive firms toward modest, explicit 
improvements, and away from black-box medicine. 
3.     The Impact of Prometheus on Personalized Medicine 
Prometheus has major real-world effects on the industry and black-
box medicine. In addition to general negative reactions—such as 
decreased venture capital investments in the diagnostic industry and 
pessimistic outlooks125—firms may shift product focuses to those which 
can still be successfully protected by patents. In addition, trade secrecy, 
with its problems for oversight and cumulative innovation, becomes 
more attractive by comparison.126 
 
 120 See, e.g., Minssen & Nilsson, supra note 119, at 384 (“[C]laims that are broadly directed 
to what may be considered to be a typical method exploited in personalized medicine will 
probably be held to be unpatentable under the Prometheus principles.”). This is not to argue 
that the previous patent system created ideal incentives for black-box medicine, a point 
discussed further below. However, under prior law, at least some patent protection was 
available. 
 121 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
 122 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 123 See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014). 
 124 See id. Even if Prometheus were tightly limited, it would still cast doubt on the 
patentability of the sort of diagnostic tests it directly addressed. 
 125 See Heidi Ledford, Software Patents Await Legal Fate, 507 NATURE 410, 410 (2014). 
 126 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
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Because Prometheus makes natural laws and routine applications of 
those laws unpatentable, firms may seek to strongly link newly 
discovered natural laws to machines or to specific treatments. Indeed, 
firms have done just that by increasing their emphasis on combination 
products that pair a diagnostic with a device or drug, or both.127 Since 
such pairings involve substantially more than just stating a natural law, 
they are likely still patent-eligible under Prometheus.128 Combination 
products tend to focus on simple, explicit links, and are tested and 
brought through an FDA approval process that focuses on validating 
those links in clinical trials.129 Thus, while this change in focus by firms 
may be entirely rational, it means that the contours of intellectual 
property rights are pushing to keep the industry focused on explicit 
personalized medicine, rather than devoting energy to the broader 
algorithms, models, and datasets necessary to bring about the benefits of 
black-box medicine. 
The major problem with moving to a combination product model 
is that it keeps personalized medicine firmly locked into the current 
regime of incremental steps. This is not to disparage the potential 
benefit of combination devices or explicit personalized medicine in 
general. However, to the extent that firms attempt to maintain 
patentability by focusing on simple, explicit links associated with 
devices, they leave untapped the larger datasets and more complex 
algorithms needed for black-box medicine and its leverage of complex 
biological relationships. Reliance on combination products also limits 
the development of medical algorithms largely to the pharmaceutical 
and medical device industries, which have the capability to market such 
combination products. Incentives for other entities—health-care payers, 
informatics companies, or other parties that do not sell drugs—are 
lower, and those firms may be less likely to innovate as a result. 
In sum, though Prometheus and its kin may or may not be justified 
on substantive patent law grounds—a debate into which this Article 
does not wade—those cases seriously decrease the patent incentives 
available in the United States for personalized medicine in general, and 
for black-box medicine in particular.130 
 
 127 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jason Karlawish, Biomarkers Unbound—The Supreme Court’s 
Ruling on Diagnostic-Test Patents, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2338, 2340 (2012). 
 128 See 2014 USPTO Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, supra note 118. 
 129 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., IN VITRO 
COMPANION DIAGNOSTIC DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/device
regulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm262327.pdf. In addition, even if the algorithm 
is not patentable as part of the combination product, patents on the other part of the 
combination—the drug or device—may obviate the need for an algorithm patent. 
 130 This Article considers only domestic protection and incentives; international analyses are 
beyond its scope. The situation in Europe appears to differ substantially; methods like those at 
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B.     Section 112 
Section 101’s patentable subject matter bar is not the only barrier to 
patent availability for black-box medicine. A more prosaic hurdle comes 
from the enablement, written description, and definiteness bars of 
section 112.131 These three requirements create substantial hurdles for 
patenting black-box medicine, and though they do not eliminate the 
possibility of patenting those inventions which survive the section 101 
analysis described above, they further limit the availability of patent 
incentives for black-box medicine. 
Section 112 states that a patent 
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art . . . to make and use the same . . . . The specification shall 
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor . . . regards 
as the invention.132 
 
issue in Prometheus would likely be patentable subject matter under Article 52 of the European 
Patent Convention (EPC), because they involve in vitro diagnostic tests performed on human 
subjects. See Minssen & Nilsson, supra note 119, at 385–86; Paul Cole, Guest Post: Prometheus 
v Mayo—A European View, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 3, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/04/
guest-post-prometheus-v-mayo-a-european-view.html. In fact, patents on the same methods as 
in Prometheus were granted by the European Patent Office (EPO). Id. Those patents were not 
the subject of opposition proceedings in the EPO, which therefore, did not rule on their 
patentability (nor, to the author’s knowledge, has the EPO ruled on the patentability of 
precisely analogous claims). However, Article 52(2) of the EPC states that “discoveries, 
scientific theories and mathematical methods . . . [and] schemes, rules and methods for 
performing mental acts” are not patentable inventions. Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 276 [hereinafter EPC art. 52(2)]. Thus, it is unclear 
whether purely algorithmic innovations would be patentable. Even if such algorithms are 
patentable in Europe, their inability to receive patents in the United States increases incentives 
for firms to keep them secret, or pursue other innovations. 
 131 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). This argument has been addressed briefly in W. Nicholson 
Price II, Describing Black-Box Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 347 (2015) [hereinafter Price, 
Describing Black-Box Medicine]. To receive a patent, a black-box medicine implementation 
must also satisfy the novelty requirement of § 102, 35 U.S.C. § 102, and the nonobviousness 
requirement of § 103. 35 U.S.C. § 103. However, those requirements are not substantially 
different in kind for black-box medicine than for other types of inventions. Potentially, the 
opacity of an innovation might make it more difficult to determine the exact contours of 
novelty, and to determine whether the invention was in fact disclosed in the prior art, but that 
difficulty arises from the § 112 challenges discussed in this section, and therefore will not be 
treated separately. 
 132 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b). Section 112 also requires that the patent applicant disclose the 
best mode of practicing the invention, but under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, failing 
to meet this requirement is no longer grounds for invalidating a patent. See Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 15, § 282(b)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
Accordingly, this toothless requirement will not be addressed here. 
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This section has been interpreted to comprise three requirements: first, 
the invention must be adequately described (written description); 
second, the patent specification must enable others to practice the 
invention (enablement); and third, the invention must be described in 
such specific and definite terms as to clearly lay out the bounds of what 
is claimed (definiteness).133 The first two requirements are typically 
grouped as a disclosure requirement, which serves the dual purposes of 
informing others about the invention and of limiting the scope of what 
is claimed.134 However, “[a]lthough there is often significant overlap 
between [them], they are nonetheless independent of each other.”135 The 
next three subsections consider each requirement’s challenges for 
patenting black-box medicine. 
1.     Enablement 
The enablement requirement traditionally provided the bulk of 
section 112’s impact.136 Under this requirement, the patent specification 
must enable a person having ordinary skill in the art (the PHOSITA) to 
practice the invention without “undue experimentation.”137 For 
inventions requiring biological materials that are not reproducible 
without undue experimentation, the requirement can be met by making 
the materials available by depositing them in a public repository.138 
Satisfying the enablement requirement for black-box medicine 
algorithms is certainly feasible, but creates significant limits on the 
strength of those patents. Enablement serves both to require 
 
 133 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 123–30 (2006) 
(summarizing section 112’s requirements). 
 134 See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that the enablement requirement “serves the dual function in the 
patent system of ensuring adequate disclosure of the claimed invention and of preventing 
claims broader than the disclosed invention”). See generally Jason Rantanen, Essay, Patent 
Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 378–81 (2013) (arguing that the two 
purposes are actually closely interrelated). 
 135 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 136 See Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written 
Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1233 (2000). 
 137 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In Wands, the court described several 
factors used to determine whether necessary experimentation is undue,  
includ[ing] (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of 
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, 
(4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of 
those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the 
breadth of the claims. 
Id. 
 138 Id. at 735. 
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disclosure—its ostensible raison d’etre—and to limit the scope of 
claims.139 The first of these functions is relatively easy for black-box 
medicine, at least in principle. For algorithms that are formally 
transparent and opaque-through-complexity, fully stating the algorithm 
in the patent will likely enable a PHOSITA to practice that algorithm. 
For algorithms that are formally opaque—that is, the product of opaque 
machine-learning algorithms—enablement for that exact algorithm may 
be achieved by depositing the data and machine-learning algorithm in a 
publicly available database in the same manner as biological 
inventions.140 Nevertheless, this may be an unpalatable solution for 
innovators seeking to keep their datasets proprietary and to guard their 
machine-learning algorithms, and also raises substantial privacy 
concerns.141 
The greater sting of the enablement requirement comes from the 
rule that the scope of the claims must be commensurate with the scope 
of the enablement; that is, an inventor cannot claim more than she has 
enabled in the patent.142 To claim a class, an inventor must be able to 
generalize some aspects of the invention, and to justify that 
generalization by reference to what members of the class have in 
common.143 The opacity of black-box medicine algorithms, whether 
formal or practical, means that inventors will typically be unable to 
generalize to broaden claims beyond those algorithms that are precisely 
disclosed in the specification. This may be a justifiable result, but others 
will much more easily be able to invent around any covered algorithms, 
leading to weaker patents—and, consequently, weaker patent-provided 
incentives for initial innovation.144 
 
 139 ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 263–64 (6th ed. 2013). 
 140 Cf. id. 
 141 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 454–57. While the HIPAA places 
substantial restrictions on the use and disclosure of personal health information, it does not 
apply to anonymous information, so anonymous deposition would resolve HIPAA concerns. 
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2015). 
 142 In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“The relevant inquiry may be summed 
up as being whether the scope of enablement provided to one of ordinary skill in the art by the 
disclosure is such as to be commensurate with the scope of protection sought by the claims.”). 
 143 See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 849–50 (1990) 
(discussing the case and the appropriate scope of enablement). 
 144 The possibility of regulatory pre-approval for black-box medicine algorithms has the 
potential to change this dynamic significantly. If a particular algorithm must be approved by a 
regulator—most likely, FDA—before marketing and use, inventing around becomes a less 
attractive option because alternate algorithms must also undergo a presumably costly FDA 
approval process. This patent-strengthening dynamic is seen in drug patents, which are 
especially strong because FDA approves exactly the drug covered (presumably) in the relevant 
patent, and not similar drugs. See W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (discussing this dynamic). FDA approval would similarly strengthen 
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2.     Written Description 
The specification of a patent “shall contain a written description of 
the invention.”145 The Federal Circuit has held that this requirement is 
separate from the enablement requirement.146 It serves to protect against 
overbroad or premature patenting, and limits the scope of the 
invention.147 The inventor must actually possess the claimed invention 
at the time of filing—whether through actual or constructive reduction 
to practice—and must demonstrate that possession by describing the 
invention fully.148 
Meeting the written description requirement ranges from 
moderately difficult, for instances where an algorithm is merely opaque-
through-complexity, to extremely challenging, when the process is 
formally opaque.149 In the first case, an algorithm can be stated even if 
the explanation offers little understanding; patents need not describe 
why the invention works, just that it does and how someone can 
replicate it.150 In the second case, actually describing a fully opaque 
algorithm in words may be impossible. However, inventors may be able 
to demonstrate possession of the invention in the same way as they can 
enable inventions that require otherwise unavailable starting 
materials—by depositing everything necessary to recreate the algorithm 
(or the final algorithm, to the extent that is actually different) in a 
publicly accessible repository.151 Another option, which has been 
suggested in the context of difficult-to-characterize biologic drugs, is 
making greater use of product-by-process claims, under which the 
 
narrow black-box algorithm patents. Regulation of black-box medicine and medical algorithms 
generally is beyond the scope of this piece, but is discussed further in Price, Black-Box 
Medicine, supra note 7, and W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Algorithmic and Black-Box 
Medicine 11–45 (Sept. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 145 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 146 The written description requirement is analytically and practically distinct from 
enablement, though the two often stand or fall together, especially outside the 
biopharmaceutical industry. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352–53 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting the analytical distinction between the two requirements and giving 
examples of enablement without adequate written description in biological and chemical 
contexts). 
 147 Id. at 1351 (“[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied 
upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the 
claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”). See generally Holbrook, supra note 133. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Price, Describing Black-Box Medicine, supra note 131, at 353–56. 
 150 See Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is not a requirement of 
patentability that an inventor correctly set forth, or even know, how or why the invention 
works . . . .”). Notably, however, with a lack of understanding, it becomes more difficult for the 
patentee to claim broader subject matter protection under the enablement requirement, as 
described above. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
 151 See Price, Describing Black-Box Medicine, supra note 131, at 353–56. 
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algorithm is claimed via a detailed description of how it was generated, 
even if the algorithm itself cannot be fully described.152 
3.     Definiteness 
Finally, section 112 requires that an invention be claimed in 
definite terms.153 This requirement is intended to make clear to others 
the meets and bounds of the claimed invention.154 Claims using 
ambiguous language, such as “words of degree,” may be indefinite 
unless the context of the invention, the knowledge of the PHOSITA, and 
the disclosure of the specification, taken together, inform the PHOSITA 
of what is claimed with reasonable certainty.155 Although definiteness 
has long been a very low bar for a patent applicant to meet, the Supreme 
Court recently took steps to raise that bar in Nautilus v. Biosig 
Instruments.156 The Federal Circuit’s reaction has been muted at best, 
leaving this area of law contested and unsettled.157 
The ability of opaque algorithms to meet the evolving definiteness 
standard is currently untested. Presumably, courts will recognize the 
inherent indefiniteness in the field, which can make otherwise indefinite 
language permissible. On the other hand, the need to make terms as 
definite as possible will likely restrict the scope of what can be validly 
claimed, leading to narrow patents.158 
 
 152 See Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and 
Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 
109 (2011) (describing product-by-process claims for biotechnology inventions). Note that 
such deposits may face other challenges for black-box medicine algorithms, since reproducing 
them will typically require access to the same data as the original algorithm. However, making 
that data publicly available raises incentive problems for the first inventor and possibly other 
regulatory complications such as compliance with health privacy laws. As I argue here, infra 
Section IV.A, and elsewhere, Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 450, moving to a 
public or public/private infrastructure model with greater data disclosure would help resolve 
these problems. 
 153 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 154 See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (“[A] patent is 
invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, 
and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art 
about the scope of the invention.”). 
 155 Biosig Instruments v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 156 See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2120. 
 157 See Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 430, 439–443 (2015) (describing the history of the definiteness requirement and the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Nautilus, and noting that “[t]he Federal Circuit’s post-Nautilus 
decisions do not even hint at a raised standard, either formally or in application”). 
 158 See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. In section 112(f) means-plus-function 
claims, the Federal Circuit has held that algorithms (though not necessarily computer code) 
must typically be disclosed in the specifications to avoid patent invalidity for indefiniteness. See, 
e.g., Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that 
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Overall, patent incentives are very low for black-box medicine. 
Algorithms are frequently unpatentable under section 101 doctrine, and 
in those instances where algorithms can constitute patentable subject 
matter—for instance, when they are linked with something substantially 
more than just the algorithm or law of nature itself—the requirements 
of section 112 will strongly limit the scope and availability of the 
resulting claims. Even when patents are available, they may be 
particularly difficult to enforce, as algorithm use may not be a visible 
part of medical care in many instances.159 Patents provide little incentive 
for black-box algorithms, and none at all for investment in the hurdles 
of datasets or validation. Patents are not the only form of external 
incentive for investment in innovative information goods, however, and 
the next Part turns to non-patent incentives, considering both secrecy 
and other direct investment incentives. 
III.     NON-PATENT INCENTIVES 
Other policy incentives can complement patent law. This Part 
describes the current incentive landscape for two types of innovation 
incentive: trade secrecy, which provides a limited form of government-
protected appropriability; and direct government incentives, including 
grants, prizes, and tax incentives. 
A.     Secrecy 
Trade secrecy is the principal private law alternative to the patent 
system for protecting technological innovation.160 Actual secrecy—that 
is, effectively keeping information from other parties, including 
competitors—allows appropriation of innovative information and thus 
enables the innovator to charge supracompetitive prices. Actual secrecy 
is enhanced by the doctrine of trade secrecy.161 Knowledge which is 
 
an abstract “black box that performs a recited function” mentioned in the specification failed to 
disclose a structure sufficient for section 112(f), although an ordinarily skilled artisan might 
nonetheless have been enabled to practice the invention). Such disclosure runs into the linked 
problems mentioned above. See supra Sections II.B.1–2. 
 159 See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 102 (noting that medical treatment knowledge, 
especially knowledge about what treatments don’t work, is hard to exclude and that related 
patents are hard to enforce). 
 160 See Bone, supra note 83, at 243 
 161 Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets 
as IP Rights] (arguing that trade secrecy doctrine facilitates disclosure by reducing the need to 
invest in means to ensure actual secrecy). 
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reasonably kept secret and which derives independent economic value 
from its secrecy is protected from misappropriation by state and federal 
trade secret law.162 However, secret information can legally be reverse-
engineered or independently created.163 Trade secrecy can protect 
information that is unpatentable, and lasts as long as the information is 
secret.164 
Secrecy creates a mixed set of incentives and effects for black-box 
medicine. For two types of innovative information, datasets and 
algorithms, secrecy can protect effectively against competition, at least 
in some circumstances. On the other hand, secrecy also creates 
substantial problems for those two types of innovation by restricting 
both cumulative innovation and the benefits gained from others’ access 
to aggregated information and algorithms. The third form of necessary 
innovation investment—validation—gains no incentives from secrecy, 
as validation must be shared to be valuable, but is hampered by secrecy 
applied to datasets or algorithms. 
1.     Data 
Sets of data are not generally protectable with patents or copyrights 
in the United States, but can be kept secret.165 The clearest example is 
Myriad Genetics itself.166 Both before and after its loss in the Supreme 
Court, the company has kept much of its information about genetic 
variation secret.167 Myriad’s gene testing process reveals combinations of 
alleles present in patients; the company then offers free testing to family 
members, and analyzes family variation to determine significantly 
 
 162 Forty-seven states have enacted some form of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, with the 
exception of North Carolina, New York, and Massachusetts, the latter two of which have 
planned 2016 introductions. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%
20Act (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). Under federal law, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
makes the theft or misappropriation of a trade secret a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 
(2012). 
 163 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (listing 
reverse engineering as a proper means of acquiring a trade secret). 
 164 See Bone, supra note 83, at 248. 
 165 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991) (“That there 
can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.”) In Europe, a sui generis system of 
database protection has existed since 1996. Council Directive 96/9/EC, art. 3, 7, 1996 O.J. (L 
077) 20 (EU), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:
31996L0009&from=EN. 
 166 See Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, supra note 29; see also 
Burk, supra note 61 (discussing the role of patents in allowing Myriad Genetics to assemble a 
large and useful dataset of BRCA1 and BRCA2 (breast and ovarian predisposition genes)). 
 167 Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical Data as 
Trade Secrets?, 21 EUROPEAN J. HUM. GENETICS 585, 585–86 (2013). 
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linked genetic patterns.168 Since Myriad has a substantially greater set of 
data on BRCA1/2 variants, only three percent of its samples have 
variants of unknown significance;169 for competitors, the rate is roughly 
twenty percent to thirty percent.170 Test samples sent to Myriad are, 
therefore, much less likely to be returned to the physician as 
“uninterpretable” than samples sent to its competitors,171 providing a 
robust competitive advantage. While Myriad’s data advantage could be 
overcome as other firms slowly assemble their own databases, the fact 
that Myriad currently possesses a much larger database—amassed from 
its period of patent protection—is self-reinforcing.172 Myriad can 
provide more results, and is therefore likely to continue receiving more 
test samples, while the resulting larger database would still be kept as a 
trade secret.173 Myriad’s business plan includes retaining and expanding 
this secrecy-based advantage of mutation data and its relatively simple 
algorithms.174 
Although the proprietary nature of datasets helps firms protect and 
recoup their investments, it also hampers future innovation.175 This 
effect is especially important for black-box medicine because it relies on 
 
 168 Id. at 585. 
 169 Id. In a genetic test like Myriad’s, the physical process first determines which alleles of a 
gene the patient has. That identification must then be interpreted to convey useful medical 
information: Are the alleles associated with a higher or a lower risk of cancer, or with no 
change? Douglas F. Easton et al., A Systematic Genetic Assessment of 1,433 Sequence Variants of 
Unknown Clinical Significance in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 Breast Cancer-Predisposition Genes, 
81 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 873, 873 (2007). When the interpreting entity lacks sufficient 
information about a particular allele to provide a useful interpretation, it is termed a “variant of 
unknown significance,” and that part of the test is inconclusive. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 
167, at 585. 
 170 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 167, at 585. 
 171 Id. at 585–86. 
 172 See Burk, supra note 61, at 239–40. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 240–41. 
 175 Keeping data proprietary raises several other potential concerns. On the ethical side, the 
Chairwoman of the European Society of Human Genetics’ Professional and Public Policy 
committee described the committee as “very concerned that such important data is being 
withheld from those who most need it.” Press Release, Eur. Soc’y of Human Genetics, Privately 
Owned Genetic Databases May Hinder Diagnosis and Bar the Way to the Arrival of 
Personalised Medicine: ESHG Reacts to Today’s Report in the European Journal of Human 
Genetics (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.eshg.org/13.0.html. She suggested that “[p]olicymakers 
should take an urgent look at the regulatory and reimbursement issues involved in genomic 
testing in order for all the data that is essential to understanding the clinical significance of 
[mutations] to be made public, to the benefit of patients and healthcare providers alike.” Id. 
Others have noted that keeping data proprietary removes them from the potential of peer 
review and makes us less certain of their accuracy. See Misha Angrist & Robert Cook-Deegan, 
Distributing the Future: The Weak Justifications for Keeping Human Genomic Databases Secret 
and the Challenges and Opportunities in Reverse Engineering Them, 3 APPLIED & 
TRANSLATIONAL GENOMICS 124, 125 (2014). Other concerns arise with respect to transparency, 
oversight, and the blocking of future research directions. 
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very large datasets to identify and use otherwise inaccessible complex 
patterns. When data are kept in company-specific silos that are focused 
on a particular set of identifiable characteristics or relationships, those 
data are typically unavailable for use in finding relationships that we 
have not yet—or cannot yet—identify. Thus, even if proprietary datasets 
can be justified, arguendo, to facilitate specific, explicit forms of 
innovative medicine,176 that justification may fall in the context of 
developing next-generation algorithms such as those in black-box 
medicine. Trade secrecy slows cumulative innovation and promotes 
duplicative investment,177 and these dynamics are especially strong in 
this context. 
2.     Algorithms 
Secrecy for algorithms also provides incentives by preventing 
appropriation, but creates a different set of problems. A black-box 
algorithm itself is unavoidably secret, by definition, but the surrounding 
information—principally, how the algorithm is developed and trained—
can be disclosed or kept secret. If the bulk of information about an 
algorithm is kept secret, only the inventor can use it, and can 
accordingly charge monopoly rents (up to the value of the product, of 
course). Secrecy is accordingly used frequently to protect the 
commercial value of algorithms in other fields, and could be similarly 
used for black-box medicine.178 
The challenge is that secret algorithms are hard to oversee, hard to 
trust, hard to validate, and cannot form the foundation of later 
cumulative innovation. Secret algorithms would be more difficult for 
regulators to oversee, although mechanisms do exist for regulators like 
FDA to receive and evaluate secret information while maintaining its 
confidentiality.179 These mechanisms are harder to stretch to private 
third parties who would need information about how an algorithm was 
developed in order to verify its quality. From a policy perspective, 
 
 176 See Burk, supra note 61; Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, 
supra note 29, at 56. 
 177 Bone, supra note 83, at 266, 269; Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade 
Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (2014). For a defense of treating trade secrecy as intellectual 
property, see Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note 
161, at 329–38. 
 178 In The Black-Box Society, Frank Pasquale extensively describes the role of deliberately 
opaque algorithms, which he dubs “black-box” algorithms based on that deliberate opacity, and 
cites the extensive commercial use of secret algorithms in, inter alia, the financial industry. See 
PASQUALE, supra note 11. 
 179 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2012) (prohibiting the use of information concerning “any 
method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection” that is submitted to FDA). 
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secrecy about algorithm development makes cumulative innovation 
harder, as others cannot learn what works and what doesn’t. Finally, 
deliberately secret algorithms amplify the challenge of getting doctors 
and patients to adopt medical technology that is not well-understood 
and that is, in fact, not fully understandable.180 
3.     Validation 
Finally, as described above, third-party validation of black-box 
algorithms is key for demonstrating their accuracy and utility. 
Therefore, secrecy is unavailable to create incentives for third parties to 
validate the strength and accuracy of algorithms. Secrecy of algorithms 
themselves also makes validation harder by limiting third-party access 
to the details needed to validate those algorithms. 
B.     Non-Exclusivity Incentives 
In addition to the exclusivity incentives described above—patents 
and trade secrecy—other policy incentives are available to spur 
innovation. A significant and expanding scholarly literature addresses 
the use of grants and prizes as innovation incentives,181 and tax 
incentives for research have recently been recognized as an important 
part of the mix.182 These mechanisms differ from exclusivity incentives 
in that rather than relying on appropriation or exclusivity to allow 
supracompetitive pricing, which recompenses innovation ex post 
through higher prices on the users of an innovation, they typically 
provide innovators with funds raised from a broader taxpayer base 
(whether ex ante or ex post).183 
Because these funding mechanisms do not rely on exclusivity, they 
do not themselves impose limits on others’ use of the innovation, which 
can potentially increase distribution of the innovation. Non-exclusivity 
mechanisms can, however, be combined with exclusivity mechanisms, 
and frequently are; an invention may be funded by a federal grant in a 
research university, patented by the university, and then licensed to a 
 
 180 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 465. 
 181 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); 
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 
303 (2013); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 999 (2014) [hereinafter Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes]; Joseph Stiglitz, 
Give Prizes Not Patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 21. 
 182 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 181. 
 183 Id. 
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firm that receives tax incentives for further research before commercial 
production.184 It is thus a mistake to think that incentive mechanisms 
that do not require exclusivity will result in wide access to the 
innovation. If it is desirable that exclusivity be avoided, non-exclusivity 
funding mechanisms need to contain conditions to that effect, such as a 
prize requiring that competing firms commit not to patent the 
invention. 
This Section does not attempt to catalog the prizes, grants, and tax 
incentives that may be generally available for black-box medicine. Since 
the field is burgeoning, specifically focused incentives are substantially 
rarer than general-purpose incentives. There is, however, one notable 
exception: President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative.185 
The Precision Medicine Initiative, announced in the State of the 
Union Address in 2015, proposes to direct $215 million to personalized 
medicine research over the next ten years.186 In the short term, the 
initiative focuses on more explicit personalized medicine goals, 
particularly identifying differentiable cancer treatments in partnership 
with pharmaceutical companies and through typical clinical trial 
methods.187 However, the longer-term goals of the initiative are (1) to 
support a national scientific network and (2) to develop a “national 
cohort study” of at least one million participants who will share genomic 
information and biological samples as well as clinical health data.188 The 
former goal presumably includes additional grant funding targeted at 
personalized medicine, including black-box methods; the latter goal is 
an important step in addressing the data hurdle,189 and recognizes the 
 
 184 For instance, researchers at Columbia University developed cotransformation, a powerful 
and basic biotechnology process for introducing foreign DNA into eukaryotic cells. See 
Alessandra Colaianni & Robert Cook-Deegan, Columbia University’s Axel Patents: Technology 
Transfer and Implications for the Bayh-Dole Act, 87 MILBANK Q. 683 (2009) (describing the 
development of the technology). The initial work was funded by grants from the National 
Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation. Michael Wigler et al., 
Transformation of Mammalian Cells with Genes from Procaryotes and Eucaryotes, 16 CELL 777, 
785 (1979). Patents on the resulting technology were licensed to thirty-four firms and eventual 
licensing revenues reached $790 million. Colaianni & Cook-Deegan, supra, at 700. Biogen 
licensed the patented technology in its Multiple Sclerosis drug Avonex. Ted Agres, Columbia 
Patents Under Attack, SCIENTIST (July 25, 2003), http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/
articleNo/22353. The company benefits from substantial tax credits for its research and 
development spending. See Taking Credit, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424127887324688404578543791391933684 (listing corporate R&D tax 
benefits). 
 185 See Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative, supra note 34. 
 186 Id. 
 187 See Collins & Varmus, supra note 4, at 793–94; see also Precision Medicine Initiative: 
Near-Term Goals, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://nihprod.cit.nih.gov/precisionmedicine/
goals.htm (last updated Oct. 13, 2015). 
 188 See Collins & Varmus, supra note 4, at 794–95. 
 189 See discussion supra Section I.B.1. 
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significant upside of centralized data collection for distributed 
research.190 
The Precision Medicine Initiative is a significant step forward in 
non-exclusivity incentives and aids to innovation. However, the 
innovation incentive story remains problematic at an overall level, with 
relatively few incentives available for the development of black-box 
medicine. 
IV.     IMPROVING INCENTIVES 
The absence of appropriate incentives significantly impedes the 
development of black-box medicine; more directly, some available 
incentives, like the particular contours of patentable subject matter, 
actively drive the development of personalized medicine in unhelpful 
directions.191 Accordingly, the final Part of this Article briefly proposes 
potential improvements to the existing incentive structure. 
Because the development process involves distinct forms of 
innovation, incentives are most usefully considered separately for each 
form. Generating large and well-curated datasets likely requires the 
greatest investment. Patents are unavailable for datasets, and trade 
secrecy is relatively ill-suited to consolidation and cumulative 
innovation. Instead, the amassing of high-quality datasets might better 
be conceived as an infrastructure for further innovation, which suggests 
a role for more direct government involvement. An additional 
possibility is the implementation of a tailored sui generis dataset 
protection regime, such as exists under European Union law.192 
Second, black-box medicine development requires incentives for 
the generation of algorithms. As described above, algorithms were 
previously patent-eligible,193 so one potential incentive for developing 
algorithms would come from reinstating patent protection for them. 
This solution, however, comes with its own set of complications. 
Regulatory exclusivity might be preferable, although that would require 
a regulatory preapproval regime that currently does not exist. Prizes are 
another potential solution194; although they are subject to many of the 
same general innovation considerations as patents, they are typically 
more flexible to implement. 
Third, incentives are needed for validation. An ever-present 
concern in complex implicit models—especially when developed via 
 
 190 See infra Section IV.A. 
 191 See discussion supra Section II.A.3. 
 192 See Council Directive 96/9/EC, art. 3, 7, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20 (EU). 
 193 See discussion supra Section II.A.1. 
 194 See discussion supra Section III.B. 
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black-box methods—is ensuring that they are valid and generally 
applicable, rather than just statistical artifacts arising from over-
specification in large datasets. This Article will thus present potential 
structures for regulatory “bounties”: rewards provided to competitor 
firms for either validating or substantially falsifying the black-box 
medicine algorithms of the innovator firms. 
A.     Incentives for Datasets: The Infrastructure Model 
As described above, significant hurdles exist in the collection of 
large, high quality datasets available for the development of black-box 
medicine algorithms.195 Patents are unavailable and trade secrecy 
presents problems discussed above: it lends itself to fragmenting rather 
than consolidating information, restricts cumulative innovation, and 
creates advantages for incumbents—like Myriad Genetics—which may 
continue indefinite specific monopolies.196 To increase incentives, 
therefore, policymakers could turn to direct government intervention or 
a public-private partnership focused on data as infrastructure.197  
In the context of genetic testing, the secrecy that protects the 
databases of incumbent firms has been analogized to an infrastructure 
problem, wherein specific sets of correlations—namely, the significance 
of individual genetic variations—have several features of essential 
facilities.198 Datasets for black-box medicine development may similarly 
take the role of common infrastructure for further innovation. Rather 
than conceiving of datasets as innovation themselves, they could be 
viewed as shared resources that enable firms to develop innovative 
 
 195 See infra Section II.A. 
 196 For a detailed description of this problem, see Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-
Generation Sequencing, supra note 29. 
 197 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005) (discussing infrastructure and the benefits of 
managing infrastructure as a commons when social and public outputs are facilitated). 
Alternately, policymakers could attempt to develop a sui generis system of database protection 
modeled on the European system, though that would fail to solve the problems of data 
fragmentation. Under Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, databases, defined as “a collection of 
independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and 
individually accessible by electronic or other means,” Council Directive 96/9/EC, art. 1, 1996 
O.J. (L 077) 20 (EU), are covered by copyright if they involve creative choices, but are otherwise 
covered by a sui generis intellectual property right, so long as their creation involved 
“substantial investment.” Id. art. 3, 7. Database owners may prevent others from extracting or 
re-utilizing the whole or a substantial part of the database for approximately fifteen years from 
publication or, if the database is kept private, completion, and may be extended by additional 
substantial investment. Id. art. 10. 
 198 Evans, Sustainable Access to Data, supra note 54. 
PRICE.37.4.6 (Do Not Delete) 4/3/2016 1:49 PM 
1440 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 37:1401 
algorithms.199 As Brett Frischmann has noted, accessible infrastructure 
resources are particularly valuable where social and public gains may be 
difficult to value commercially; broad improvements in medical care fit 
this model well.200 
Under this view, direct or indirect government intervention could 
usefully aid the generation of datasets. On a direct level, collecting data 
shows a prima facie advantage for government. In the United States, 
many millions of patients participate in Medicare and Medicaid, where 
the government provision of insurance allows access to patients’ 
medical records.201 The Department of Defense and the Department of 
Veterans Affairs provide direct health care to and consequently collect 
data for over eleven million military personnel, veterans, and their 
families.202 In other nations, the concentration of data with the 
government is even stronger. For example, the U.K. National Health 
Service (NHS) provides free health care to over sixty-three million U.K. 
residents,203 and consequently accumulates tremendous amounts of 
data. 
Government possession of data brings its own challenges. For 
instance, it is emphatically not the case that the data gathered by the 
Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs are neatly 
available in high-quality interoperable formats. In fact, the two agencies 
have spent billions trying and failing to upgrade their electronic records 
systems, which remain incompatible.204 And the U.K.’s NHS, while it 
has a great deal of data, is prevented by strict privacy rules from using 
 
 199 Others have called for collation and availability of health data, notably Marc A. Rodwin, 
The Case for Public Ownership of Patient Data, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 86 (2009); cf. Evans, 
Sustainable Access to Data, supra note 54 (discussing data access to FDA’s Sentinel data); 
Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, supra note 29 (describing concerns 
about data sharing of genomic information). 
 200 Frischmann, supra note 197, at 996 (using malaria research as an example of an endeavor 
with high social value, but with low commercial value relative to the research costs). 
 201 See Total Monthly Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://
kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/total-monthly-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2016) (noting 71.8 million Medicaid/CHIP enrollees in October 2015); Total Number of 
Medicare Beneficiaries, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/total-
medicare-beneficiaries (last visited Jan. 14, 2016) (noting 49.4 million Medicare beneficiaries in 
2012). 
 202 Tricare, which offers health for military personnel, had 9.2 million eligible beneficiaries 
in 2008. See TRICARE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, BASIC FACTS OF THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM 
(2008), http://www.tricare.mil/stakeholders/statistics.cfm. The Veterans Health Administration 
had 9.1 million enrollees in 2014. See VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, SELECTED VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION CHARACTERISTICS: FY2002 TO 
FY2014 (2015), http://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/Utilization/VHAStats_2014.xlsx. 
 203 About the National Health Service (NHS), NAT’L HEALTH SERV., http://www.nhs.uk/
NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/overview.aspx (last updated July 1, 2015). 
 204 Hannah Winston, Billions Wasted on Fruitless Bid to Create Paperless Vet Health 
Records, NBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2013, 3:32 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/billions-
wasted-fruitless-bid-create-paperless-vet-health-records-f8C11001233. 
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much of it, and certainly from sharing information with third-party 
private algorithm developers.205 However, government entities are 
taking steps in the direction of data collection, even if not in sharing: the 
Veterans Health Administration is well into its effort to collect genetic 
and phenotypic information on a million veterans for research 
purposes.206 But there are currently no indications that this 
information—or other information like it—will be made available for 
further innovation by private entities. 
The other existing large government initiative in this area is FDA’s 
Sentinel initiative. Sentinel is designed to collect and analyze drug safety 
data on very large populations—with a goal of acquiring health data on 
over 100 million Americans—to provide further information on post-
approval drug safety.207 In the Sentinel project, FDA has taken on the 
role of an infrastructure regulator in facilitating the development of a 
longitudinal health records database of insurance claims information, 
medical records, prescription drug records, and information from 
military care and Medicare.208 FDA’s involvement, along with the 
authorizing statute, enables FDA to cut through some of the legal and 
practical hurdles to assembling datasets; the drug safety analysis is 
conceived as part of the agency’s public health authority, which allows it 
to fit into an exception to normal limitations on transferring and using 
identifiable data.209 A pilot project, Mini-Sentinel, has already been 
developed in association with private institutional partners, and is 
actively engaged in drug safety research.210 FDA’s Sentinel-related 
safety-centered statutory authority could potentially extend to cover 
substantial swathes of research on differential impacts of drugs, since 
efficacy and safety are intertwined in evaluating drugs.211 Furthermore, 
 
 205 Others have noted the richness of the NHS’s data and the challenge of its privacy rules. 
See Wayne Parslow, How Big Data Could Be Used to Predict a Patient’s Future, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
17, 2014, 3:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2014/jan/17/big-data-
nhs-predict-illness (“Although currently shielded by privacy rules, the personal data that can 
risk score every NHS patient already exists. And it is already far more centralised and 
normalised than in countries such as the US, giving the UK the opportunity to become the 
world leader.”). 
 206 See Million Veteran Program (MVP), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http://
www.research.va.gov/MVP (last updated Dec. 15, 2015). 
 207 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (2012) (setting a goal of 100 million patients for 
postmarket risk identification and safety analysis by July 1, 2012). 
 208 Id. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(III)(aa)–(cc); see also Barbara J. Evans, Congress’ New 
Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 588 (2009) [hereinafter 
Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy]. 
 209 Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, supra note 208, at 598. 
 210 Susan Forrow et al., The Organizational Structure and Governing Principles of the Food 
and Drug Administration’s Mini-Sentinel Pilot Program, 21 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG 
SAFETY (SUPPLEMENT S1) 12 (2012). 
 211 Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, supra note 208, at 601. 
On the other hand, broad research questions that stray beyond the actual public health use 
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FDA could centralize the data it collects and make the data available to 
other researchers to pursue these research avenues.212 However, the 
Sentinel project is not taking this broad and centralized infrastructure 
path. Instead, so far Mini-Sentinel has been focused on traditional views 
of drug safety and adverse events.213 More importantly, rather than 
creating a centralized dataset, FDA has pursued a distributed model in 
which it develops research queries and then transmits those queries to 
its institutional partners (hospitals, health systems, and the like) that 
actually hold the data, before those partners transmit de-identified 
answers back.214 Thus, although Sentinel has the potential and promise 
to be the type of centralized research dataset that could provide wide-
ranging infrastructure for the development of black-box medicine, it 
seems that FDA is taking the project in a different direction. 
Nevertheless, the structure of Sentinel, and the authority that is vested 
in FDA by its statute, indicates at least the potential for broader 
government intervention into enabling datasets for future research. 
The federal government is also pursuing a different, de novo path 
to creating a new dataset as part of the Precision Medicine Initiative, 
which seeks to support personalized medicine, in part by creating a 
national cohort study containing the genomic data, clinical data, and 
biological samples of at least one million subjects;215 this would be much 
smaller than the Sentinel dataset, but still quite substantial. Although the 
exact contours of the eventual cohort are unclear, it is likely to involve 
existing patient networks.216 The Initiative also clearly contemplates 
federal funding to lay the groundwork for this dataset—the 
infrastructure for the data infrastructure, so to speak—including a 
projected ten million dollars for FDA “to acquire additional expertise 
and advance the development of high quality, curated databases to 
support the regulatory structure needed to advance innovation in 
precision medicine and protect public health,” and five million dollars 
for the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information 
 
function of the Sentinel system might run afoul of HIPAA regulations that treat research 
differently. Id. at 615–16. Further public perception difficulties may arise if FDA broadened 
Sentinel’s mission, since there is a distinct tradeoff between public health benefits and privacy; 
as research broadens, privacy protections diminish when more data is spread among more 
research projects and, presumably, more researchers. Id. at 605. 
 212 Id. at 601–03. 
 213 See Background, MINI-SENTINEL, http://mini-sentinel.org/about_us/default.aspx (last 
updated Sept. 18, 2014) (“Mini-Sentinel monitors the safety of FDA-regulated medical products 
through assessment of routinely collected electronic healthcare data in response to FDA 
concerns.”). 
 214 Forrow et al., supra note 210, at 14–15. 
 215 Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative, supra note 34. 
 216 Id. (“This ambitious project will leverage existing research and clinical networks and 
build on innovative research models that enable patients to be active participants and 
partners.”). 
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Technology “to support the development of interoperability standards 
and requirements that address privacy and enable secure exchange of 
data across systems.”217 The data from this cohort study will be “broadly 
accessible to qualified researchers,” though the definition of “qualified 
researchers” and any limitations to the acceptable research use of the 
data remain to be determined.218 
The government could take this approach in a different direction 
to enable black-box medicine (and other personalized medicine) by 
simplifying the data collection step, generating the dataset-
infrastructure, and then allowing private parties to compete in the 
analysis and validation steps. Data access could be leveraged in at least 
two ways. First, the data could be used exclusively for some time; firms 
could bid for access to segments of the data, coupled with a 
commitment to make any resulting algorithms publicly available after 
some period of exclusivity.219 Second, the data could be made freely 
available, but with the caveat that firms using the data disclose their 
algorithms. This would enable a broader set of concurrent 
developments, while still allowing firms to capture benefits of their 
(reduced) innovation investments.220 
Similar options exist to pursue database generation through public-
private partnerships. deCODE Genomics famously exemplifies such a 
partnership. The Icelandic biopharmaceutical firm successfully lobbied 
the Icelandic Parliament to create a population-wide Health Sector 
Database including genomic, genealogical, and health information.221 
Court challenges shifted the database from mandatory to voluntary,222 
and the effort was highly controversial,223 but over 160,000 individuals 
still volunteered,224 and the company has published extensively on the 
 
 217 Id. 
 218 See id. 
 219 This approach has potential political economy problems related to its implementation; 
the specter of the government collecting health records and turning them over to private parties 
for their exclusive benefit would likely meet substantial resistance. This dynamic certainly exists 
in other frameworks—notably in the patenting of government-funded innovation under the 
Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, sec. 6(a), §§ 200–211, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019—but may be even 
more politically sensitive in the context of health information. 
 220 This plan would also potentially avoid some of the political economy problems discussed 
supra note 219. However, it would exacerbate privacy and reidentification concerns. See Cohen 
et al., supra note 43. 
 221 Vilhjálmur Árnason, Coding and Consent: Moral Challenges of the Database Project in 
Iceland, 18 BIOETHICS 27 (2004). 
 222 Renate Gertz, An Analysis of the Icelandic Supreme Court Judgement on the Health Sector 
Database Act, 1 SCRIPT-ED 241 (2004). 
 223 See, e.g., Árnason, supra note 221; Jeffrey R. Gulcher & Kari Stefánsson, The Icelandic 
Healthcare Database and Informed Consent, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1827 (2000). 
 224 Unrivaled Capabilities, DECODE GENETICS, http://www.decode.com/research (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2016). 
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explicit genomic links it has found.225 Similarly, the Human Genome 
Project provides another clear precedent. There, a collaborative effort 
between government and private researchers sequenced the human 
genome with the intention of providing it freely to future researchers 
and innovators as a common infrastructure resource.226 
B.     Incentives for Algorithms 
The heart of black-box medicine is the development of 
biomedically useful algorithms by plumbing the masses of health data.227 
However, as described above, this process is neither easy nor 
inexpensive.228 And current intellectual protection is both inadequate 
and skewed away from black-box medicine. Accordingly, better 
incentives are needed to drive algorithm development. Potential 
incentives could come in at least three forms: patent protection, 
regulatory exclusivity, or prizes. 
1.     Patents 
Patents are an obvious source of incentives for algorithms, as they 
were generally available for algorithms until the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Prometheus.229 Congress could override that statutory 
interpretation decision by amending the statute to, for instance, state 
that novel diagnostic algorithms are patent-eligible subject matter. 
While this approach is initially attractive, challenges arise in both 
enactment and enforcement. 
First, overruling Prometheus may face problems of overbreadth. In 
particular, black-box medicine is similar to mainstream computer 
software patents and algorithms, which are criticized by academics, 
frequently disliked by the software industry itself, and a target of reform 
efforts.230 Broad-brush patent changes to revive algorithmic patents 
 
 225 See, e.g., Thorlakur Jonsson et al., A Mutation in APP Protects Against Alzheimer’s 
Disease and Age-Related Cognitive Decline, 488 NATURE 96 (2012); Unnur Styrkarsdottir et al., 
Nonsense Mutation in the LGR4 Gene Is Associated with Several Human Diseases and Other 
Traits, 497 NATURE 517 (2013). 
 226 Francis S. Collins et al., The Human Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale Biology, 
300 SCI. 286 (2003). 
 227 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 228 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 229 See discussion supra Section II.A.1. 
 230 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012); Jay 
Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Business-Method Patents, 
43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against 
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY 
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may, therefore, face considerable resistance and may also have negative 
impacts on other industries.231 Finally, of course, the Supreme Court 
may have correctly judged the innovation incentives regarding laws of 
nature and determined that patents on relationship-based algorithms 
may be harder to invent around and therefore may block overall 
innovation.232 
Second, patents granted on black-box medicine algorithms face 
significant difficulties in enforcement. Knowing whether infringement 
is occurring and proving that it has occurred are both likely to be 
difficult, especially for more complex algorithms.233 Thus, though 
restoring the patent system to its status before Prometheus has some 
initial appeal for driving the development of stable, well-defined 
algorithms, other possibilities may better align incentives to drive 
innovation forward. 
2.     Regulatory Exclusivity 
Regulatory exclusivity could provide incentives better tailored to 
algorithms. Instead of relying on the patent system to provide the 
incentive of excludability, in regulatory exclusivity a regulator restricts 
competition by limiting the availability of pre-market approval to 
competitors.234 Thus, regulatory exclusivity requires the existence of a 
 
L.J. 1025 (1990); Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and 
Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191 (2008). But see Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, 
A Technical Critique of Fifty Software Patents, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249 (2005) 
(finding the most frequently cited software patents worth protection). 
 231 Merely restoring patent law incentives for black-box medicine might also result in 
problems for black-box medicine itself. Although this Article begins with the position that 
Prometheus and Myriad problematically reduced the patent incentives available for black-box 
medicine, see discussion supra Section II.A.2, those initial incentives had flaws as well. In 
particular, since black-box medicine resembles software in many ways, we might expect to see 
some of the same problems that infect patents in the software industry, including frequent 
issuance of patents on obsolete technologies, a mismatch between patent claims and actually 
invented subject matter, broad and vague claim language, and substantial transaction costs. See, 
e.g., Chien, supra note 230; Mark A. Lemley, Address, Software Patents and the Return of 
Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905 (2013); Thomas, supra note 230. 
 232 The scholarly debate on these issues is extensive and need not be recapped here. See 
Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011). For a discussion of the 
relevant knowledge/embodiment distinction in patent law, see Kevin Emerson Collins, The 
Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1279 (2014). 
 233 For an analogous situation, see, for example, W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in 
Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 526–
27 (2014) [hereinafter Price, Making Do in Making Drugs] (describing the difficulties secrecy 
creates in enforcing manufacturing process patents). 
 234 See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 71; Yaniv Heled, 
Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (2015). “Exclusivity,” though widely used, 
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premarket approval regime. In multiple contexts where such 
preapproval requirements exist, some form of regulatory exclusivity is 
used as an innovation incentive;235 in others, it has been proposed.236 
FDA administers the majority of extant applications of regulatory 
exclusivity, primarily around the marketing of small-molecule drugs 
and biologics.237 
Assuming the existence of a preapproval regime, regulatory 
exclusivity could function the same way for black-box medicine 
predictive models as for other innovations within preapproval regimes. 
For example, in the context of drugs, FDA will not approve a generic 
drug within five years of the approval of a drug based on a new chemical 
entity.238 For biologics, the period is twelve years.239 Similarly, if FDA 
approval were required for black-box medicine models to be 
commercially marketed and used, FDA could withhold that approval 
from imitator products for a fixed period of time as a reward to the 
innovator company.  
The main advantages for regulatory exclusivity are flexibility, ease 
of enforcement, and strong disclosure. Regulatory exclusivity is more 
flexible than the patent system. It is administered by an expert agency 
with experience in the specific technology and—ideally—an innovation 
mandate as well as a regulatory health and safety mandate.240 Even 
without substantial changes to the statutory contours of exclusivity, the 
agency can apply it flexibly. Statutory changes are also easier because 
regulatory exclusivity is not bound by the same treaty requirements as 
 
is somewhat inaccurate because competitors are not excluded from the market; instead, a faster, 
cheaper path to market—whether biosimilar approval or an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application—is foreclosed for some period, effectively sharply increasing the costs of approval 
and practically limiting market entry. Id. at 318–19. Heled proposes the more general term 
“regulatory competitive shelter” to describe this phenomenon, id., but I will continue to use 
“regulatory exclusivity,” largely for simplicity’s sake. To the extent that regulatory competitive 
shelters could take on more shades than pure exclusivity—for instance, purely higher costs to 
market entry, in the nature of regulator enforced mandatory license fees—the broader 
phenomenon might more appropriately describe alternate solutions. 
 235 See Heled, supra note 234 (describing regulatory exclusivity regimes for drug, biologic, 
and pesticide development). 
 236 See Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 233 (proposing regulatory exclusivity 
for drug manufacturing innovations to promote such innovation). 
 237 Heled, supra note 234 (listing fourteen such regimes, of which thirteen are administered 
by FDA and one by the Environmental Protection Agency). 
 238 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012) (granting five years of market exclusivity for new 
chemical entities). 
 239 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012) (granting four years of market exclusivity and an 
additional eight years of data exclusivity to biologics). 
 240 Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 71. 
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patent law; it can be flexible across products and across industrial 
sectors in a way that patent law cannot.241 
The second advantage is that regulatory exclusivity is substantially 
easier to enforce than patents, with consequently more uniform 
enforcement. The default of a market preapproval regime is the inability 
to enter the market; thus, if regulatory exclusivity exists for a particular 
well-defined product, competitors can be prevented from entering that 
market simply by denying approval for the competitors’ products for the 
appropriate period of time.242 This contrasts with the difficulty and 
expense of enforcing patents.243 
The third and final advantage to regulatory exclusivity comes only 
if exclusivity is coupled with a disclosure requirement. In the context of 
drug development, regulatory exclusivity demands the production of 
knowledge (that a drug is safe and effective, as measured by clinical 
trials), and requires at least some disclosure of that knowledge.244 
Although clinical trial data are not fully disclosed now,245 the basic 
results of trials—that a particular drug is safe and effective for a 
particular indication—become public and can eventually be relied upon 
 
 241 The treaty on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), to which the 
United States is a party, requires that patent systems be relatively uniform across different 
countries. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. For the purposes of this Article, the most important requirement of 
TRIPS is that patent terms cannot be technology-specific. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in 
Innovation Policy, supra note 71, at 365 (suggesting that regulatory exclusivity may help tailor 
innovation policy without violating TRIPS). Note, however, that countries may choose to 
disallow the patentability of medical techniques, as Europe has largely done, and as the United 
States has effectively done. See EPC art. 52(2), supra note 130; see also 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) 
(2012). Black-box medicine and algorithmic medicine in general could potentially be excluded 
from patentability, but probably not given an intermediate or differently structured set of 
incentives from other technological areas. 
 242 On the other hand, the definition of a “product” might be particularly flexible in the 
context of black-box medicine; fluid boundaries would raise some of the same enforcement 
challenges that exist in patent law. 
 243 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY: 2011 
(noting that, for patent infringement claims under $1 million, median legal costs are $650,000; 
for claims from $1 million to $25 million, costs are $2.5 million; for claims over $25 million, 
median costs are $5 million). 
 244 See Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 71, at 366–72. 
 245 A rapidly growing movement focuses on the disclosure of clinical trial data. See Kamran 
Abbasi, Compulsory Registration of Clinical Trials, 329 BMJ 637 (2004); Richard Lehman & 
Elizabeth Loder, Missing Clinical Trial Data, 344 BMJ d8158 (2012); Michelle M. Mello et al., 
Preparing for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1651 (2013). 
However, these disclosures are not tied to FDA approval. Arguments have long been made that 
information submitted for regulatory approval should be disclosed, see Thomas O. McGarity & 
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming 
Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1980), but those arguments have not 
succeeded. 
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by generic companies to secure approval.246 In general, since the 
regulator who approves the product is the same entity that enforces 
regulatory exclusivity, innovators have an incentive to be forthcoming 
and candid in their disclosures, rather than facing the incentive to 
obscure useful technical information in patents to minimize disclosure 
to competitors.247 
The principal challenge with implementing regulatory exclusivity is 
that it relies on a market-spanning regulatory preapproval regime, 
which does not currently exist for data-driven diagnostic tests.248 A full 
analysis of FDA’s diagnostic test regime and what is most appropriate 
for black-box medicine must await future work. In brief, however, while 
FDA does currently regulate some diagnostic tests, many exist outside 
its current scope, and there is certainly not a comprehensive regime in 
place.249 Were such a regime implemented, regulatory exclusivity would 
be an attractive possibility. Nevertheless, the possibility of regulatory 
exclusivity as an innovation incentive is probably not sufficient 
justification to impose a premarket approval regime if one would 
otherwise not be warranted. 
Other problems with regulatory exclusivity are inherent in the 
name and the concept: it, like the patent system, focuses on exclusivity. 
To the extent that black-box medicine models rely on underlying 
natural laws, excluding others from using those laws presents the same 
preemption problems that the Supreme Court named as problematic for 
innovation in Prometheus.250 Additionally—and problematically—
applying regulatory exclusivity relies on defining the contours of a 
specific model. When models are multifaceted, complex, and implicit, 
defining the contours of a model and knowing whether another model 
overlaps with those contours may be an insurmountable hurdle.251 
 
 246 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2012) (allowing generic drug applicants to rely on the finding of 
safety and efficacy of the pioneer drug). 
 247 See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 942–44 (2011) 
(citing Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560–62 (2009), and Benjamin 
N. Roin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2007, 2025 (2005)). 
 248 FDA does regulate diagnostic testing kits and companion diagnostics, but does not 
regulate testing services provided by individual laboratories. Steven Gutman, The Role of Food 
and Drug Administration Regulation of in Vitro Diagnostic Devices—Applications to Genetics 
Testing, 45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 746 (1999). 
 249 See id. 
 250 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
 251 Although black-box models may be static and stable, at least initially, complex big-data 
models in medicine may eventually be flexibly updated. This plasticity would make exclusivity 
mechanisms, whether regulatory or patent-based, less useful by further complicating the 
definition of a product. 
PRICE.37.4.6 (Do Not Delete) 4/3/2016 1:49 PM 
2016] BIG  DATA, PATENTS, AND FUTURE OF MEDICINE 1449 
3.     Prizes 
A third possibility to enhance innovation in algorithms is reliance 
on prizes or grants as a reward for innovation.252 Grants and prizes each 
typically rely on the award of money—typically a fixed sum—to solve a 
defined problem. Under a grant regime, firms compete for monetary 
incentives that are then to be used to develop an innovation.253 Under a 
prize regime, a monetary prize is offered to whichever firm can develop 
a solution to a defined problem.254 Typically, the prize amount is fixed, 
though it need not be.255 Such devices can avoid the requirement of 
exclusivity, either in situations where it is unavailable (e.g., when the 
innovation is unpatentable) or where free distribution is mandated as 
part of the incentive regime (e.g., where entering a prize competition or 
winning a grant requires relinquishing patent rights and committing to 
disclosure). 
Prize and grant systems both require knowing the approximate 
contours of a defined problem with a defined solution and knowing the 
rough value of a solution to the problem.256 Since personalized medicine 
in general and black-box medicine in particular are broad endeavors 
with significant implicit knowledge, clearly defining the problems and 
solutions appears particularly difficult. Goals could be defined very 
generally; for instance, any algorithm that decreases costs while 
 
 252 An extensive literature examines prizes and grants as alternatives to patents. See 
Abramowicz, supra note 181; Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging 
Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards 
Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) (arguing for the superiority of an 
optional prize system); Joseph Stiglitz, supra note 181; Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace 
Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25 
(2007). But see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing 
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (arguing against prizes). For an overview of grants and 
prizes that places them in a taxonomy with patents and tax incentives, and argues that all four 
can set economic incentives that should be at base indistinguishable to rational firms, see 
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 181, at 310–13. For an argument that patents and prizes, at least 
as applied, are largely indistinguishable, see Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes, supra note 
181. Roin also offers an extensive bibliography. Id. at 3–5. This literature has typically not 
included regulatory exclusivity among the menu of options, perhaps because its exclusivity 
model parallels that of patents; to the extent that regulatory exclusivity has benefits over patents 
for certain fields of technological innovation, it may obviate certain criticisms that lead at least 
some scholars to prefer prizes. 
 253 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 181, at 320–21. 
 254 See id. at 317–19. 
 255 For instance, instead of a fixed sum of money, a prize could be defined as a fraction of 
identifiable government savings attributable to the innovation. Cf. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne 
Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is it the Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & 
ECON. 51, 54 (2002) (arguing that prizes should be tied to social value); Earl L. Grinols & James 
W. Henderson, Replace Pharmaceutical Patents Now, 25 PHARMACOECONOMICS 355, 356 
(2007) (proposing drug prizes tied to sales). 
 256 See Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes, supra note 181, at 1026–29. 
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maintaining or increasing health measures. Such very broad (and very 
valuable) algorithms might be the most useful, but might also have the 
hardest time overcoming the competitive incentives of private parties to 
keep the algorithms secret. Goals could also be defined more narrowly; 
for instance, any algorithm that decreases the frequency of adverse 
reactions to taking a drug with a narrow therapeutic index by ten 
percent. 
But the challenge of determining the optimal incentive size 
remains. The advantage of patents and other exclusivity regimes is 
that—at least ideally—the size of the reward should track the social 
value of the innovation.257 Firms can use market information to project 
that value and invest accordingly. For prizes, whoever sets the prize—
typically the government—usually must determine the eventual social 
value in advance; however, governments are typically not well-suited to 
this task.258 Potentially, this problem could also be solved by basing the 
reward not on a specific dollar amount, but rather on a fraction of 
savings to government health programs like Medicare or Medicaid. This 
would increase proportionately with social value without requiring pre-
estimation of the eventual size of the reward. However, many medically 
valuable uses are not particularly economical; for example, keeping a 
patient alive may lead to more costs in the future. Finally, prizes face 
considerable political economy problems; though many medical prizes 
have been proposed, implementation follows far behind. 
Overall, although the specifics of implementation will require 
considerable care, prizes appear to be an attractive alternative to more 
traditional exclusivity incentives for the development of black-box 
medicine models. Achieving the right level of specificity and project 
definition is challenging, but that challenge also arises with patents and 
regulatory exclusivity regimes. Moreover, prizes can be precisely 
tailored and can be structured to require disclosure so as to enable 
continued cumulative innovation. 
 
 257 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 
(2003). 
 258 Grants face the same type of problem, though the grant-making organization must 
accurately estimate the cost of the innovation rather than the social value. Grants have other 
advantages: they are frequently used in biomedical research to incentivize innovation, and are, 
therefore, familiar; they leverage a social discount rate which is typically lower than private 
discount rates; and they avoid capital constraints and risk aversion. See Hemel & Ouellette, 
supra note 181, at 308. However, like prizes, they do not increase with the size of the eventual 
social welfare gain of the innovation, and therefore, face additional steps in guiding the 
allocation of innovative effort among projects. 
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C.     Incentives for Validation 
Finally, incentives are needed for model validation.259 Unlike both 
traditional medical development and explicit personalized medicine, 
black-box medicine cannot readily be validated in standard, 
straightforward ways. However, black-box medicine still needs 
validation to ensure reliability. Instead of scientific understanding, 
clinical trials, and postmarket surveillance, the validation of complex, 
implicit black-box medicine models require validation through other 
computational mechanisms. Developing methods for that validation, 
and ensuring they are consistently applied, is an important piece of the 
innovation policy picture. 
Innovation policy should ensure that appropriate incentives exist 
to drive validation. A bounty could be implemented for external 
validation (with standards likely set by FDA). Bounties could be set as a 
small fraction of the overall revenues of the model—as part of the initial 
regulatory exclusivity bargain, if one exists—paid by the original 
developer. The size of the reward would then roughly increase with the 
overall value of the model.260 Rewards for confirmatory validation 
would ideally decrease asymptotically, so that initial validation would be 
much more valuable than further confirmation, but that any 
confirmation over a particular validity threshold received at least some 
reward. This could be set to ensure that the overall fraction of originator 
revenue that could be siphoned to incentivize validation would be 
capped.261 On the contrary side, rewards for finding problems should 
also exist, and should likely not decrease with repetition.262 
As an additional factor, concerns about validation are exacerbated 
when data and models are kept secret and proprietary. Implicit models 
are difficult to validate for the reasons described above, more difficult 
without access to the modeling code, and extremely difficult without 
access to the data on which the model was based. Thus, ensuring 
 
 259 See supra Section II.B.3. 
 260 One challenge is that focusing on monetary goals, whether revenue-based or savings-
based, might focus incentives on models which deal primarily with costs rather than health 
improvements. If the principal goal of black-box medicine is cost-reduction, this focus would 
be unproblematic. However, if—as seems likely—improving health outcomes is either a 
primary objective of black-box medicine or at least an important ancillary objective, then an 
alternate path to valuing validation would be needed, or some combination of monetary savings 
and health outcomes. 
 261 For instance, for a validation cap of two percent, the first validator to pass a certain 
threshold could receive one percent, and then each subsequent validator could receive half the 
amount of the previous validator; the sum of these fractions converges to two percent. 
 262 The incentives available for challenges to models might be expected to decrease naturally; 
if a model is called into question, its value presumably decreases and any fixed fraction of that 
value would also decrease. 
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disclosure is important to enable not only development and cumulative 
innovation, but also validation of existing models. 
Overall, the appropriate balance of innovation incentives for the 
development of black-box medicine requires significant and detailed 
further work. However, an optimal final landscape might include some 
push to assemble useful information, either via a public or public-
private enterprise, tailored prizes to help drive algorithm development, 
and bounties for the purposes of third-party validation. In the latter two 
categories, the prosaic solution of increased grant funding for academic 
model development may also provide a significant boost in an area 
where the incentive needs are significant but not excessively large. 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, black-box medicine offers immense promise for changing 
the way medicine is practiced and the way medical technologies are 
created and deployed. However, the growth of black-box medicine 
requires an active and effective innovation policy. The current 
intellectual landscape in the United States creates problematic incentives 
that encourage firms to keep data secret and to focus on simple drug-
device linkages, rather than developing the necessary capabilities to 
develop black-box medicine. This Article has suggested a few ways to 
change that innovation policy on the path to the major economic and 
health benefits of the next step in personalized medicine. 
More generally, this Article stands along previous work to suggest 
that our broad-brush innovation system has problematic implications 
on the ground as it is applied to different questions of innovation in 
different industries.263 The pharmaceutical and biomedical industries 
are typically characterized as areas where patents work fairly well; other 
industries, like software, are characterized as areas where patents work 
much less well to drive innovation.264 This Article argues for greater 
 
 263 See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2004) (defending industry-neutrality of patent laws); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002); Michael W. 
Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. 
REV. 845 (2006); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring 
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); William Fisher III, The 
Disaggregation of Intellectual Property, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 2004, at 24 (arguing for more 
industry-specific patent laws); Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, FED. LAW., Feb. 2008, 
at 44 (defending industry-neutrality of patent laws); Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming 
the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487 (2007) (arguing for more 
industry-specific patent laws); Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 233. 
 264 See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 
173 (1986) (reporting different rates of patent importance in different industries); Wesley M. 
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nuance and granularity even within industries. Drug manufacturing 
responds differently to patent and regulatory incentives than drug 
discovery and development,265 development of new uses responds 
differently than developing initial uses,266 and, as I have argued here, 
simple diagnostic tests respond differently to patent incentives than 
complex implicit algorithms. Setting incentives right, and directing 
innovation policy accordingly, is key to moving forward toward the 
future of medicine. 
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